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INTRODUCTION 
When most people think of the technological innovations of the 
20th Century, they think of such things as radio, television, antibiotics, 
birth-control pills, and synthetic materials, synthetic fibres, automobiles, 
helicopters, jet transports, airplanes, atom bomb, space exploration, computers. 
This is perfectly proper. The 20th Century has witnessed numerous spectacular 
innovations, and it is perfectly appropriate that technological innovation
 
should be symbolized in peoples' minds by dramatic breakthroughs such as these. 
However, ifwe shift our thinking to other levels, the story becomes 
much more complicated. For the social process out of which such innovations 
eventually emerged was usually much less dramatic, consisting of innumerable " 
steps, most of them typically very small, in the fashioning of a new device or 
technique. Moreover, such technological innovation itself has a long "pre­
history," during which time it is subjected to a series of improvements until 
it becomes practically workable. Italso has a long "post-history," during 
which time the innovation is subjected to a prolonged series of further improve­
ments. Such improvements may include redesigning to economize on materials, 
substitution of new materials possessing superior performance characteristics, 
modifications to meet the specialized needs of numerous submaikets or sub-uses, 
treatment procedures to prolong the life of components, -etc. The point is 
that our mental conceptions offer a still-picture of what is, in reality, a long, 
drawn out dynamic process. 
These points become particularly significant when our concern is not 
restricted to technological history in the narrow sense but inciudes the 
economic consequences of new technologies. For, things which may be of 
secondary or even of trivial importance for technological history may be the 
very essence of economic success or failure. Innovations which in technoldg­
ical terms are quite spectacular and compelling may fail to meet elementary 
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commercial tests and constitute economic failures. Conversely, minor,
 
pedantic improvements in a product or process which may be totally unnewsworthy
 
and, indeed, invisible to all except highly trained specialists, may spell ,
 
the decisive difference between commercial success or failure. Thus, the economic
 
analysis of a technological innovation may involve a very different focus from
 
what appears in popular or engineering accounts. Even where an innovation involves
 
entirely new concepts, or constitutes a genuine discontinuity, a sharp and dramatic
 
departure from the past, its contribution to the growth of productivity will make
 
itself felt only more slowly, as numerous obstacles are overcome, as many small
 
improvements and modifications are introduced, and as necessary conditions are
 
fulfilled which are essential to the full exploitation of improvements which already
 
exist. Application of technology to users' needs requires a demand (either active
 
or latent) for a service that can be satisfied by a new device or devices. At
 
the time the new device is developed and introduced it must embody those technology 
advances that enable it to meet the performance requirements and return a profit
 
to both the builder and the user. In addition, increases in the useability 
of the device can create an increased demand for it, and as more of the devices
 
are manufactured and sold opportunity exists to improve the device to make it
 
even more useable or profitable. When the market becomes large enough, other
 
builders will construct other devices and will use the available pool of
 
technology in a different way to develop a marketable device. Studies of the 
flow and ebb of industries, especially the petroleum refining industry, has led
 
Enos1 to offer an explanation of technological progress which divides that 
phenomenon into two phases, the alpha and the beta. The alpha phase consists of 
the invention, development and first production plants. The beta phase consists 
of the improvement of the innovation to improve the economic viability of the device. 
-John mos, "Invention and Innovation in the Petroleum Refining Industry, n
 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962.
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This study examines and analyzes the air transport industry from the point of 
review of the alpha and beta phase concept of Enos to determine if these phases 
can be applied to this industry and to shed some light on the motivating forces 
afoot in the industry. 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
In any industry, the growth of that industry is usually brought about by 
providing a need not satisfied elsewhere. In the transport industry, this need 
is speed of movement. Of course, the public is not prepared to pay unlimited 
amounts for this increase in speed. Indeed, as we will show innovations have 
been introduced in the air transport industry only when they have been associated 
with cost reduction or obtaining another desirable characteristic. It has been 
proven many times that the passenger is willing to pay a premium for this speed. 
The growth of the air transport industry from its inception in 1926 stimulated by 
the government by contracting with private concerns to carry the U.S. air mail 
has been steady and sometimes very rapid (see Fig. 1).2,3 Because of the original 
payment schemes for airmail routes of so many dollars per mile of route flown 
2Smith, Henry Ladd, Airways; the History of Commerical Aviation in the 
United States, A. A. Knopf, N. Y., 1942. 
arner, E. P., The Early History of Air Transportation - A Lecture delivered 
at Norwich University, No. 21, 1937, Maple Press, York (England) 1937. 
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per trip, there was not a great emphasis on passenger-carrying capability,
 
although this increased as more. experience was gained with the flying of the 
route and provided extra revenue to the operators. Previous passenger­
carrying operations were hard put to make ends meet without airmail payments.
 
In addition, the U.S. Government constructed and maintained lighted airways, 
promoted airfields and provided other services that were very necessary to the 
operation of aircraft across country on a regular basis. Because of the form of
 
the airmail payment, initially, a rate based on a percentage of the airmail 
revenue, changed later to a piound rate (up to $3per pound for the first 1000 miles
 
plus 30* per mile for each extra 100 miles) , the drive to reduce direct operating
 
costs to a minimum was not highly developed; however, safety and reliability of
 
operations were necessary if the airline operators were to make any money at all
 
(by increasing the appeal of passenger service).
 
In this time period (1922-1930), aircraft developed from single-engine 
3
fabric-covered biplanes to trimotor2, and 4-engine high-wing monoplanes of both 
all-metal and plywood construction, as well asicontinuing the progression of 
large biplanes. To further encourage the development and expansion of passenger­
carrying air transport systems, the McNary-atres Act was passed on April 29,
 
1930, which changed the method of compensation to paying the airline operators 
for the cargo space available plus extra for passenger-carrying capacity,
 
navigational aids furnished (such as radio), and night-flying capability. In 
addition, capability of consolidating the present airmail system was granted 
which resulted, following government pressure, in eliminating small operators 
and establishment of a trunk line system which basically is in existence today. 
ISmith, H. L., Airways, The History of Conmercial Aviation in the United States. 
A. Knopf, N. Y., 1942, Appendix I and II. 
2 Ingles, Douglas J., Tin Goose-The Fabulous Ford Trimotor, Aero Publishers, Inc., 
FallbTrook, Calif., 1968. 
3See also Chapt. 4, The Airframe Revolution from the book by John B. Rae, 
"Climb to Greatness, pp. 58-76, The NiT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
 
The stimulus given to the air transport system resulted in the availability of 
greater revenues and sufficient amounts of capital funds to enable larger and 
faster aircraft to be considered and acquired, and hence being able to cope 
with the growth in passenger traffic, both projected and real. 
Because of the progress of aeronautical research by NACA and development
 
of powerful radial air-cooled engines for the U.S. Navy by Pratt-Whitney and 
Curtiss Wright, and the support of all-metal aircraft construction by the 
Army and Navy and private operators, it was possible to configure aircraft 
made completely of metal that would operate at'much higher speeds and lower 
costs and could completely change the complexion of the air transport system. 
The research work of NACA pointed out at this time (1928-1929) the tremendous 
gain to be had in increasing speed by streamlining (reducing drag) and using 
the cowled radial engine. This, coupled with a need for safety and reliability 
in operation, pointed the way to twin-engine low-wing all-metal monoplanes as 
the most effective solution to the problem of traversing the country from 
coast-to-coast in less than 24 hours while carrying a reasonable payload (at a 
direct operating cost less than a Ford trimotor). The first such machine was 
the Boeing-2472 ' 3with a cruising speed of 180 mph carrying a passenger complement 
of 10, and with the capacity of 1000 pounds of cargo for mail. This machine was 
developed to enable United Air Transport, Inc., to meet the competition of 'NA 
on the Chicago to West Coast run. TWA having acquired Fokker F-32's (large 
30-passenger, 125 mph cruise), to fly the run to augment the Ford and Fokker 
'warner, Ed P., Technical Development and its Effect on Air Transportation -

A Lecture delivered at Norwich University, Feb. 23, 1938, Maple Press,
 
York (England) 1938.
 
Ingles, Douglas J., 747, The Story of the Boeing Super Jet, Aero Publishers, 
Inc., Fallbrook CA, 1970. 
3Bowers, Peter .M., Boeing Aircraft since 1916, Putnam, London, 2nd Ed., 1968. 
6 ° "4
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trimotors already in hand. Subsequently, all Fokkers were removed from service 
inbecause of the investigation surrounding a crash on March 31, 1931 Kansas 
1 
which killed then-famous Knute Rockne. 2 This placed TWA at a competitive dis­
advantage and resulted in their request to Douglas for a new aircraft--the DC-I 
and DC-2 resulted from this inquiry. 
In the above, it is noted that the driving force to cause change was the 
requirement for increased performance (speed) and load-carrying capacity by the 
U.S. Post Office put in such a way as to release the competitive drive of the 
various companies and individuals involved. These companies responded by 
supporting the development of these new machines which could enhance their 
income and prestige. It ws not a broad marketplace, however. 
After the DC-2 was developed and introduced in 1934, progress was spurred 
by the requirement of the airlines to meet the surge in traffic demand; from 
this the DST (DC-3) was developed, and this machine dominated the airways for 
three years. As traffic increased in volume, the airlines funded Douglas to con­
struct a four-engine aircraft. The DC-4E was built and, although not acceptable, 
did lay the groundwork for a redesign resulting in the DC-4, which was used as the 
basis for the DC-6/DC-7 series aircraft. At the same time, Boeing used its B-17 
design as a basis for the 307 Stratocruiser after Boeing had success in using the 
B-15 wing and engine system as a basis for the 314 Flying Boat. Here, as always, 
the goal was to increase the passenger-carrying capacity (seat miles per unit of 
time) at some reduction in cost per passenger mile by increasing size or speed of 
the aircraft, keeping in mind that increases in passenger comfort must proceed 
at the same time. FAGVORIGIN S 
____ ___ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __OF__ poeR 
iIngles, Douglas J., The Plane that Changed the World, Aero Publishers, Inc., 
Fallbrook, CA, 1966, pp. 9-13. 
ZThe cause of the crash was attributed to wing failure caused by dry rot in the 
wooden spar members. Regulations were passed which required periodic inspection
of the wing members, thereby ostensibly making obsolete the plywood covered wooden 
wings of the Fokker. This milestone regulation was the forerunner of federal 
regulatory involvement which would effect significant increases in safety over
the years to come. 
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Thus, we see that progress in Technology has made possible 
increases inpassenger size per unit
 
increase in speed per unit (reduction in time of flight) 
(for instance, see Fig. 2)
 
decreases incost per unit to operate
 
increases in comfort
 
increases in safety
 
increases in traffic volume
 
reduction in fares to user with fare set to
 
compete with other modes of travel
 
increases inprofit to operator and owner investor1
 
Technological breakthroughs, like the all-metal cantilever wing, constant 
speed propeller, exhaust gas superchargers, pressurized cabins, the jet engine, 
the swept wing, the supercritical airfoil, occur rarely. The continued increases 
in productivity2 have come about by the clever integration of a number of modest 
advances in aerodynamics, engines, materials and structures into the design of a 
new aircraft. The purchase of a new aircraft occurs when the market demands 
increase to the extent that the airlines need new aircraft and are in a strong 
enough financial position to commit to a major equipment investment, Further, 
the financial comunity must judge the airlines to be a good risk given predictable 
regulatory environment. And, finally, the manufacturer must see a large enough 
market to be reasonably certain of a fair and timely profit on the R&D and pro­
duction costs. The manufacturer will then incorporate as many of the accumulated 
technology advancements into the new design as will result in the performance 
advance which will meet the airlines requirements with acceptable risk to the 
manufacturer. 
'However, it is the intention of the CAB in setting fares and licensing routes 
to keep profits at or below a certain percentage that ill provide a reasonable 
return to the operators, as well as reasonable fares to the user. 
2See Appendix A for definition of productivity. 
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Individual modest advances in techmologies also have been incorporated 
into major modifications of a given basic aircraft design. This "family" design 
concept is utilized by most manufacturers to increase its market for a given 
basic airplane design. Use of more advanced technology occurs to a lesser degree 
in such instances, however, because of the high cost of major redesign and pro­
duction tooling changes.
 
While this discussion has focused on the aircraft, additional air transport 
system productivity increases have accrued to a large degree also by improvements 
in the air traffic control system, the ground passenger and aircraft services, and 
maintenance procedures. However, in the discussion that follows, we will concentrate 
on the aircraft component of this transport system. 
ALPHA-BETA RELATIONSHIP 
Bnos has developed, in his analysis of the technology of petroleum refining, 
a conceptual framework of the innovative process which is quite useful for the air 
transport industry as well. 1 Simply put, this characterization involves a categori­
cal division of any particular innovation into its so-called alpha and beta stages. 
The alpha stage may be described as the period of inventive activity on a particular 
innovation which precedes its introduction as a marketable commodity, whereas the 
beta phase refers to the process of technological change which occurs subsequent to 
this commercial introduction. (See Fig. 3 for graphic illustration.) Superficially, 
this may appear somewhat similar to the Schumpeterian distinction between innovation 
on the one hand and its subsequent imitation on the other, though as we shall clearly 
see in the instace of transport aircraft, the alpha and beta division does not 
correspond at all to the technologically active/passive division implied by 
Schumpeter's conceptual categories. 
IJohn Dios, Petroleum, Progress and Profits, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge
1962 (see an outline of this process in Table I). 
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Since we wish to study the air transport industry in terms of its alpha 
and beta phases, we-must examine the development of the industry and its 
supporting equipment to identify when alpha phase changes occur. To do this 
we have listed the major technology advances incorporated into each new air­
craft as itwas introduced from 1928 to 1970. These data are presented in 
Table II. Examination of these data enables the grouping of the aircraft 
and separation into alpha and beta phases. This ispresented inTable III, 
where you can see the major difference between alpha phases is the beginning 
of the capability to start a new generation. 'It should be noted that while 
we consider that the Boeing-247 did usher in a new generation (that of the twin­
engine low-wing stressed skin monoplane thought of as the DC-3 generation) we do 
not consider that the DC-4 ushered in a new generation since it was not equipped 
with a pressurized cabin. The rest of the table follows in a natural sequence:­
four-engine pressurized machines, turbo jet swept wings, and large high by-pass 
ratio turbo fan vehicles (747, etc.). 
It is useful to explore the implication of the alpha/beta conceptual frame­
work somewhat further. First, instead of describing a particular innovation in 
isolation, these categories specify a relationship between a particular innovation 
and other innovations which either precede or follow that innovation temporarily. 
Thus, a particular innovation may either be examined as an alpha phase in rela­
tion to other innovations which follow it or as a beta phase relative to an 
innovation which preceded it. The concrete phenomena which we seek to conceptual­
ize are the aspects of technological unevenness of development and of technologicil 
coplimentarity which are often present within innovative development but 
wich appear to be of particular significance in the case of air transport. 
Thus, a particular innovation B may not yield any substantial increases in 
productivity unless it is preceded by innovation A, while the full productivity 
-10­
gains of innovation A cannot be fully realized until the introduction of its 
complementary technology, B. An excellent example of this from the current 
state-of-the-art aircraft technology is the gas turbine engine (innovation A) 
and the swept back wing (innovation B). Until the jet engine introduced the 
possibility of efficiently extending the thrust of a power-plant through the 
speed of sound with viable efficiencies, there was no increased productivity to 
be gained from a swept-back wing. However, subsequent to the introduction of gas 
turbine propulsion, its full productivity potential1 could not be achieved without
 
the improvements offered by the complementary teclmology of wing sweep (which 
effectively raised the Mach number 2 to the maximm possible before transonic 
airflow and the attendant drag rise begins to occur on the wings). When the 
jet engine was introduced the limitations heretofore placed on aircraft speed 
(by the drop-off in effective thrust at higher speeds CM = 0.65 - 0.75)) was 
removed and a more effective way of increasing the cruising speed than reducing 
the wing thickness was required. This mechanism was the sweptback wing, which 
postponed the effects of compressible flow over the wing to a much higher forward 
speed. That these two technological advances appeared on the scene at about the 
same time is interesting but, in fact, fortuitous (when one jet engine was first 
conceived the use of sweepback to delay the drag rise had not been suggested). 
The first installation of jet engines in military aircraft was in straight­
wing craft. The Germans incorporated the sweep-back principle into their second 
generation jet aircraft while the Americans and British did not make the step 
until shortly after 1II (following their unearthing of the horde of German 
data on swept-wing configurations.) Yet, the first installation of a jet engine 
It should be realized that the overall compression ratio of the jet engine system 
increases as the true operational air speed increases and it can be shown that 
the overall efficiency of operation for the true jet is greater than the reciprocating 
engine plus propeller in the vicinity of W1 even if the propeller efficiency does 
not fall due to the effects of Mach number on the propeller itself; therefore, it 
is important to operate the jet at as-high a speed as possible. 
2Mch number is the ratio of the aircraft speed to the speed of sound. in 
the outside air. 
in a transport-type aircraft was in the DeHaviland Comet which could not capitalize 
on its speed and altitude (comfort) advantage due to certain basic flaws in the 
fuselage structural design and construction (fatigue failure); by the time this 
problem was solved, the die was cast for the appearance of the U.S. swept-wing 
jet transports, which were not only larger and faster, but could span the U.S. or 
the North Atlantic nonstop with reductions in direct operating costs below those 
of current machines. Virtually all major technological advances within the air 
transport industry correspond to this model of the combined interaction of techno­
logical unevenness and technological complemetarity as discussed elsewhere in this 
paper. The interplay generally is between a number of technological innovations, 
not just two, as in this example. 
We can pursue the quantitative relationship between the alpha and beta 
phases of aircraft technology and their subsequent impact upon productivity 
at several levels of analysis. For example, we may identify particular innova­
tions at the level of transport aircraft generations, where the relevant 
generations may be thought of as (1) the movement from single engine biplanes to 
2-3 engine biplane and high-wing monoplanes; (2) from these multiengine biplanes 
and high-wing monoplanes to all-metal stressed skin twin-engine low-wing mono­
planes; then to (3) four reciprocating engine pressurized aircraft; to (4) turbo­
propeller aircraft; to (5) turbo-jet, with swept wings, and finally (6) large 
high by-pass ratio turbo-fan aircraft. I These relevant generations and sources of 
their characteristics are noted on Table III. At a less macroscopic level, we can 
examine the technological innovation process within each of these generations, or, 
finally, at the level of particular aircraft models within each of these particular 
generations. 
'The somewhat arbitrary nature of this definition of generations is difficult to 
avoid. For example, one coulid convincingly argue that all-metal strut-wing mono­
planes are substantially different than their cantilever winged successors, and 
that wide-bodied turbo-jets are likewise separable from the narrow fuselage 
predecessors, though neither of these distinctions is accomplished by our categori­
zation. A critical consideration here is a sufficient aggregate data series to 
characterize the aloha and beta phases of the generations defined. 
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Technological Change Between Generations 
Although the qualitative aspects of each generation enumerated above are 
briefly described by such variables as construction material, engine number or 
engine type, it should be clear from our discussion of the critical importance of 
the phenomenon of complementarities within technologies that we are in fact differ­
entiating organically integrated aircraft types which necessarily differ radically 
inmany additional characteristics from generation to generation. These differences
 
are measured by factors such as cruise speed, cruise altitude range, wing-loading, 
payload, the aerodynamic parameters of lift and drag, and so on. Clearly, all .the 
complementary technologies must be developed to a higher level to realize a gener­
ational transition: one does not achieve a modern jet aircraft by just mounting 
turbojet pods on a DC-3 airframe. 
We may even identify the innovation of air transportation itself as the 
particular technological advance.. Compared with the railroad or bus industry, 
it is especially difficult to establish a quantitative measure which embraces 
the huge quantitative technological shift represented by aircraft relative to 
preceding and substitute modes of transportation, thus making it difficult 
to ascertain the productivity advances attributable to innovative activity of 
the alpha phase. 1 However, it is much more straightforward to document the 
operating cost improvements attributable to the beta phase of air transportation. 2 
'The matter is, in reality, even more complicated. When did the 'pre-history" of 
the airplane end? Although the Wright Brothers established the technical feasi­
bility of powered flight on that momentous day in 1903 in Kitty Hawk, the 
innovation of the airplane as a commercial proposition was still far from 
achievement. It was a long way from Kitty Hawk to the point where a new form 
of passenger transportation may be said to have become available in the sense of 
functioning as a serious competitor to the existing forms of transportation. This 
occurred in 1919 in the U.S., England, France, and Germany by adaptation of 
military aircraft for this purpose (see pp. 183-184, Gibb-Smith, C. H., Aviation, 
an historical survey from its origin to end of II, London IN 90, 1970). 
Th1s summary is further elaborated in the Appendix B. 
Of' POSE- 4jAIAT 
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For example, from 1929 to 1953, Kendrick has established that output per unit of
 
labor in air transportation increased by 660%. Over another period, 1928-1968,
 
the cost per available seat mile (in constant (1954) dollars) dropped from
 
13.40 cents for the Fokker "Super Universal" aircraft to 0.93 cents for the PC-8
 
turbo-jet, or just 1/14 of the 1928 levels. Even if we restrictour time series
 
to the period corresponding to so-called modern transport aviation, dating from
 
around 1936, these improvements are equally impressive. For example, the labor
 
productivity for the entire period 1928-1953 increased by an average of over 8%
 
per year, while the corresponding figure for the shorter 1936-1953 period is more
 
than a 7% improvement per year on the average.
 
Another dramatic quantitative measure of the advances made in airline tech­
nology and productivity is demonstrated by a calculation of "social savings" which 
have been realized in the industry.3 At 1964 traffic levels, using the technology
 
available in 1933 to provide an equivalent sized air transport system would have
 
cost $8.293 billion, whereas the actual expense was $1.701 billion (all 1954 dollars),
 
thus representing a social savings of $6.592 billion, or over 80% of the amount
 
using the 1933 technology.4
 
We can gain some further insight into the relative importance of the alpha 
and beta phase improvements if we focus upon the inter-generational data, where 
'Kendrick, John W. Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1961, p. 555.
 
2Phillips, Almarin, Technology and Market Structure, Heath Lexington Books, 
Lexington, Mass., 1971, pp. 40-51.
 
3On the concept of social savings and its detailed elaboration with respect to 
the railroad industry, see Robert Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth, 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964. 
4 For this calculation see Figure A-II (Appendix:B). 
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transitions between subsequent generations are regarded as alpha technological 
shifts and the intra-generational improvements are regarded as the beta
 
technological shifts. The relevant data are summarized in Figures 4 and 5, 
which plot the cost per available passenger seat mile and the productivity 
index, "aircraft seat miles per hour," for the aircraft used in the U. S. air 
transport industry for their first year in commercial service, their introduction 
dates spanning the period from 1928-1970. Perhaps the most striking aspect of 
this focus, in terms of our alpha/beta model of innovation, is the apparent 
continuity across generations. Upon reflection, this is hardly surprising, since 
we may assume an unwillingness to adopt a new model (innovation) until its costs 
and usefulness reach the point where its adoption represents a substantial improve­
ment. When the innovation reaches this point, the potential benefits and the 
projected growth are likely to become substantial. As noted previously, an aircraft 
company will not undertake the costly design/development of a new model aircraft until 
it is reasonably assured of a large market; i.e., large enough to retire development 
and start up costs in a teasonable peri6d of time. The airlines generally will buy 
a new model aircraft when they have a need--either new routes requiring new capabili­
ties, new capabilities required to meet competition, new capabilities to meet revised 
regulatory requirements, new capabilities to keep operating costs down, or the 
approach to the end of the life cycle for their existing aircraft fleet. 1 Financial 
status of the airlines also wields a strong influence in that the introduction of 
new aircraft should ensure a reasonable increase in return on investment over 
continued acquisition and use of existing aircraft currently in production. 
Before we discuss the progression with time of the air transport industry 
growth characteristics that relate to the alpha or beta phase development, we 
This is very difficult to assess. In the 1926-29 time period the aircraft
 
were written off in 3 years and replaced. Now, in the 1960-70 time period,
 
the life can be 17 years or more.
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should examine in. some detail how the first low-wing all-metal twin engine 
transports came into bing since they set the stage for the rapid expansion of 
the air transport industry in the 1930's. We shall review the genesis of the 
Boeing 247 and its follow-on and nemesis the DC-i, 2,and 3 series aircraft. 
BOEING-247 GENESIS - Bill Boeing, who had a reasonable business in building 
military airplanes, wanted to get into the comnercial aircraft field. Of his 
first mail plane, the Model 40, he only sold one to the Post Office Department. 
However, because of the Air Mail Act of 1925, the Post Office was to turn over
 
the job of flying the mail to qualified private operators. Boeing redesigned
 
the Boeing Model-40 to use a Pratt-Whitney Wasp engine for use as a combination
 
mail and passenger plane and, together with Edward Hubbard, bid on the contract 
air mail route (CAM-18) from Chicago to San Francisco.1 They won the bid, 
posted a performance bond and formed a separate company "'BoeingAir Transport," 
to do the flying. The aircraft to be used were Boeing 1o6del-40A's, which could
 
carry 1000 lbs of mail plus two passengers (at $200 each per one-way trip).
 
Boeing built 25 aircraft and stationed them along the route to start service
 
by July 1,1927. This route was 2000 miles long and took 23 hours to traverse.
 
The Model 40A's iere replaced by 40B4's with 4-passenger capacity,2 and the
 
overall passenger traffic climbed to such an extent that bigger machines were
 
needed, especially since competition in the form of Transcontinental Air
 
Transport equipped with Ford trimotors was to begin on July 9,1929 as an
 
air/rail service from New York to Los Angeles.
 
Smith, Henry L., Airwys, The History of Co ercial Aviation in the
 
United-States, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1942, p.119 .
 
21ngles, Douglas J., 747; Story of the Boeing Super Jet Aero Publishers,
 
Inc., Fallbrook, CA, 1970.
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Boeing introduced the Mobdel 80, a trimotor biplane with 12-passenger 
capacity even before the July 9, 1929 start date. This was followed by the 
Model 80A with accommodations for 18 and a crew of 3. The use of NACA cowlings 
on the 8OA increased the cruising speed by i0 mph. 
1 
To further increase the income of United Air Lines (which was part of a 
combine composed of Boeing Air Transport in a merger with Boeing Aircraft, 
and Chance Vought called United AircraftPtatt-Whitney, Hamilton Standard, 
Transport Corporation) an attempt was made to build a for-mail-only aircraft that 
economical than the 80A. This could be done successfully,was faster and more 
Boeing figured, because the airmail subsidy was figured on a weight-mile basis. 
Experience with metal-covered pursuit airplanes for the military gave 
Boeing sufficient confidence to build a single-engine all-metal low-wing 
the Monomail (Qodel 200) which carried no passengers butmonoplane known as 
could carry 1000 lbs of mail at 158 mph over the route. It was one of the 
fastest aircraft in the air at the time (first flew on May 6, 1930). 
However, before this machine could be put to use, the McNary-Watres Act 
was passed (April 29, 1930) and changed the airmail rate structure from 
emphasizing dollars per pound per mile to dollars per unit volume cargo space 
per mile, plus extra for passenger-carrying capacity,over-the-mountains flying, 
night operations and other variables. Subsequent modifications to the vbnomail 
did not yield a satisfactory passenger-carrying option and Boeing was forced to 
look elsewhere while still operating the 80A's. During this period, 1hA was 
formed and began to operate Ford Trimotors and Fokker F-32's which were bigger 
and faster than the 80A's. 
'Bowers, Peter M., Boeing Aircraft Since 1916, Putnam, London, 2nd Ed., 1968. 
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Boeing had just participated in a high-speed bomber competition and while 
they lost to Martin they produced, in the spring of 1931, a unique twin-engine 
all-metal machine that was very fast and, along with the Martin machine, set the 
stage for bombers for the next decade. Boeing continued to amass experience with 
all-metal aircraft in the P-26 Pursuit aircraft design. 
With the pressure of competition becoming greater from TWA, United Air Lines 
requested that Boeing build them a new machine based on the twin-engine bomber 
design. The aircraft that resulted from this effort was the Boeing 247, a 
10-passenger machine that could cruise 50-70 niph faster than any other air­
liner and was more economical. In addition, the direct operating cost (D.O.C.) 
was reduced from 10.81/sifor the Boeing 80A to 7.78/ASM for the 247, at the 
same time the cruising speed went up from 125 mph to 180 mph, and the time 
required to travel from New York to San Francisco went down from 27 hours to 
19-1/2 hours. She was equipped with deicing devices on the wing and tail leading 
edges, controllable pitch propeller, retractable landing gear, an automatic pilot,
 
cabin soundproofing, and trim and boost tabs on the control surface, and could 
fly over any obstacle on the route with one engine out. United Aircraft and 
Transport Corp. ordered 60 of these aircraft; the first to be delivered in July 
1933. This machine, Boeing felt, would put them into a position to dominate the 
market, a long-time goal of United Air Lines. 
DC-i, 2, & 3 ORIGINS - In any history of the U.S. air transport industry, 
the cardinal point of the development of the DC-3 is referred to time and time 
again. It is desirable to understand how this came about and what the motivating 
forces were that led to its development. 
Basically, it can be said that Douglas was responding directly to a letter 
of request from 11VA (Jack Frye, letter dated 8/2/32) for an airplane to compete 
IAircraft Seat Mile. 
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with the Boeiig-247 soon to be introduced by United Air Lines on its run from 
to the West Coast. 1 Chicago 
The drive away from plywood-covered machines was brought to a head by the 
Thute Rockne crash on March 31, 1931 in a Fokker F-10 trimotor in Kansas, and 
the attendant requirement by the Bureau of Air Commerce that immediate and 
periodic inspections on plywood-covered aircraft be carried out. 2 (The Fokkers 
were red-tagged until this inspection could be carried out.) This was not 
economically feasible on these aircraft, as it entailed complete removal and 
regluing of the wing plywood surfaces. Since the presently available Fokker 
machines were all equipped with plywood surfaces, they were essentially grounded. 
This forced TWA to stop flying Fokkers and use Ford trimotors exclusively. 
These were safe and economical but noisy and slow. In addition, United Air 
Lines who was in neck-and-neck competition with TWA in the east-west air 
transportation race had just contracted with Boeing to build 60 twin engine 
all-metal transports based on the experiences gained with the Boeing entry in the 
Army Air Force all-metal bomber competition of 1931. After TWA was rebuffed in 
buying these new transports from Boeing (at least until UAL was equipped with 
them), Jack Frye and staff laid out the requirements for a new transport to 
compete with the Boeing 247. These letters of request were sent in August 1932 
to five manufacturers--Douglas included. Douglas responded and the result was the 
DC-2 put into service in May 1934. This machine was based on Douglas' long 
experience in producing military aircraft, as well as the experience of its 
con­recently acquired subsidiary Northrop Aircraft who had pioneered in the 
struction of law-wing all-metal monoplane aircraft. Since Douglas had the 
IIngles, Douglas J., .The Plane that Changed the World, Aero Publishers, Inc., 
Fallbrook, CA, 1966, p. 19. 
2 Ibid - pp. 9-13. 
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Boeing-247 layout to go by it could only improve on it, and did. The DC-1 and 
DC-2 met the challenge of the 247 and laid the groundwork for the DC-3 introduced 
in 1936 which became the standard for the airlines between 1936 and 1939.1 
In the discussion that follows, we regard as a measure of productivity the 
product of aircraft seats tines cruising speed (AS x V9). Costs per available seat 
miles are examined at the same time to ensure a viable aircraft. These two
 
factors must be examined together until such a time as the data are available 
to treat productivity in a more classical sense.2 A cursory examination of the 
data shown on Figs. 4 4 5 indicates that since all-metal stressed skin transport 
aircraft appeared on the scene in 1933, in the U.S., the ability to carry passengers 
increased, as represented by the factor AS x Vc by 20-fold in 40 years while the 
costs per seat mile have decreased by a factor of 10. These data indicate a steady 
progression of improvement in aircraft productivity (AVc) and reduction at the 
1 It should be noted here that the DST/DC-3 was built to order of American Airlines, 
and did not represent a proposal by the manufacturer to an airline. 
ZWe would ideally like to measure the productivity of civil transport aircraft 
in physical units such as the number of passengers it is possible to deliver 
over a specified distance in a specified time per unit of labor and capital. 
However, not only are these data unavailable to us in general, for the purposes 
of our analysis it is further necessary to disaggregate productivity across 
particular aircraft. Moreover, since the relative capital intensity of the air 
transport industry has not remained constant over the historical period of 
interest to us, there is no straightforward way to define a unit of "labor and 
capital." The measures generally available to stand as surrogates for produc­
tivity are direct operating costs per available passenger seat mile on the one 
hand, and available seats times aircraft velocity on the other. Clearly, each 
of these has its advantages and disadvantages, and each abstracts from important 
aspects of the productivity of the aircraft, though it is an empirical reality 
that the trend of one measure is closely correlated with the inverse of the 
other. In any case, we have chosen to present both of these criteria which 
taken together give the reader a feeling of the overall picture of productivity 
increase. We wish to include the costs directly, since we believe this to be 
a central decision variable in the process of aircraft inmovation. Though not 
totally adequate in its inclusion of productivity, these costs would seem to be 
a necessary condition for the alternative measure of productivity to be of any
relevance whatever. 
of'p@1
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same time in D.O.C. as each new aircraft was introduced. Of special. interest is 
the jump inproductivity following WWII for the Martin-202 and Convair-440 series
 
This jump was almost equivalent to that brought about by the introduction
aircraft. 

of the 4-engine transports, the Boeing-307 and the DC-4. However, these aircraft
 
classes were designed with a different set of operating conditions, the 4-engine
 
machines being larger range, ultimately being able to fly coast-to-coast before
 
Also shown on these charts isthe Comet, a 4-engine jet
giving way to the jets. 

transport with a slightly swept wing introduced in 1952; note the high value of DOC 
upon introduction which was acceptable at the time because of the uniqueness of 
the travel offered; i.e., speed and comfort. The Comet operation was very successful 
until two machines were lost by fuselage fatigue failures and all airline useage 
ceased until 2-3 months before the Boeing-707 was introduced into service. However, 
by the time the 707 was introduced, the DOC of the Comet had been reduced only to
 
that of the DC-7C, the productivity of the Comet was still 30% less than that of
 
the 707, and due to the hiatus of the operation never really recovered its place
 
in the marketplace. 
Examination of Figs. 4 &5 for comparisons of increases in productivity and 
reductions in cost in the alpha and beta phases indicates that these criteria 
show positive jumps at the outset of a new generation; i.e., at the beginning of 
the alpha phase. However, the subsequent improvements are not the same for the 
various generations. Whereas the costs continue to decline as each new model 
is introduced and the productivity does usually increase this trend does not 
always continue. The costs tend to go down during the beta phase but the 
productivity does not always increase. This suggests that other factors are
 
at-work, such. as matching the-vehicle. more -closelyto the market dunand, to 
provide jet service to more people (examine points for 707, DC-8, 720, 990, 
and 727). Table IVhas been prepared to indicate roughly the gains in 
productivity and reduction in direct operating costs (DlOC) for the alpha 
phase from 1940 to 1970. At the introduction of each new series, there is a 
gain in both productivity and cost reduction, as well as speed increases, except 
for the Comet. However, in considering the Comet as a start of the alpha phases, 
it should be regarded as a false start since it only gave speed increase at a 
tremendous sacrifice in both productivity and DOC with respect to the presently 
available reciprocating engined Lockheed 1049C; however, when the 707/DC8 
series were introduced, they provided increases in speed, productivity and 
reductions in DOC over the available 4-engine -prop driven aircraft (1049C and 
DC7C) to make their introduction viable. The wide body, high bypass ratio jet ­
fan -series has been included to show that while the speed advantage was small, the 
large increase in size and use of a more efficient engine gives a tremendous increase 
in both productivity and reduction in DOC. 
Technological Change Within Generations 
In the beta phase, growth, is accomplished by three factors (see Table I): 
o construction of larger units 
o adoption of ancillaiy advances by other industries 
o increase in operating skill or know-how 
In the main, the productivity gains and cost reductions achieved in the beta 
phase have been due to the construction of larger units and have been impressive 
and usually larger than that realized in the generational shift - alpha phase. 
From 1933 to 1956,. for example, costs per passenger seat mile for two-engine 
aircraft declined from 7.75* to 2.20*, or down to less than 1/3 of the original 
level of the Boeing 247, while productivity rose from an AS x Vc of 1800 to 
14,600. Similarly, for the beta phase of the four-engine generation, costs 
dropped from 3.22* in 1940 to 1.80* in 1953, almost halving it in 13 years,
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while the productivity rose from 9400 to 25,000 and the cruising speed rose 
from 200 to 500 mph. In the five years of the data available for the turbojet, 
direct operating costs declined from around 1.7€ to 1.15* for the newly intro­
duced vehicles while the productivity actually went down (basically because of 
no essential growth in speed and size as the smaller model sizes adapted to new 
market segments. However, later in a discussion of the DC-8 development a growth 
of productivity along with reduction in costs is noted). 
Examination of the data shown in Figs. 4 & 5 in terms of lumped gains for 
the beta phase Crable V) shows that the DC-S generation progress resulted in 
gains in productivity of 710% or 12,800, and cost reduction in DOC of 5.6* as 
compared with the alpha shift gains for the DC-S series to the 307 series of 150% 
or 5700, and 1.55* respectively. This trend is also apparent for the 307 generation 
only ifyou consider the jet series starts with the Comet; i.e., 169% or 15,800
 
and 1.32*, compared with 129% or 12,100 and -1.03t for the beta and alpha phase
 
comparisons. Although there is no specific comparative data available from Miller 
and Sawers for the Turbojets past 1965, these aircraft have grown during the beta 
phase in such a way as to increase aircraft productivity and reduce direct 
operating costs. 
Also shown in Figs. 4 &5 are some estimated data for the wide-body series 
of high by-pass ratio turbofan aircraft. It is seen that these machines, at 
their introduction, have produced large gains in productivity with attendant 
reductions in the direct operating costs; mainly because of their increase in 
passenger-carrying capacity and use of high by-pass ratio jet fans with much 
lower fuel consumption. At the present time, all of these machines are under­
going beta phase changes to adjust the passenger-carrying capacity to the market 
by either reducing or lengthening the fuselage. 
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Examples of increases in operating skill and know-how affecting operating 
costs right down to particular aircraft, within each of the above generations 
as well, are sunmarized in Figs. 6, 7, and 8. 
Looking first at piston vehicles, we see from Fig. 6 that this phase of the 
2-engine Boeing-247 operating history experienced a decline in D.O.C. from 
nearly 7* per available seat mile at its inception down to slightly over 5 
7 years later (in constant 1954 dollars). This represents a respectable 6.1% 
per year reduction incosts. The relative cost reduction for particular 4-engine 
piston vehicles appears to be somewhat larger, a 7.7% per year cost reduction per 
available passenger mile. For this machine, there was no basic change inproduc­
tivity over this period. 
Within the turbo-prop generation, we see that the Lockheed L-188 Electra 
costs dropped an average of 7%per year, as seen in Fig. 7. This trend continues 
through the current generation of turbojets as well and, if anything, the relative 
cost reduction achieved for a particular aircraft through its life span seems to 
be increasing for the more recent generations, From Fig. 8, we may calculate that, 
for the Boeing-707 over its first 5 years of operation, direct operating costs per 
seat mile dropped an average of 8.7%per year,.from 1.56* in 1959 to 1.0* in 1964. 
The discussion thus far has considered the single dimension of costs per 
passenger seat mile or that in conjunction with a productivity factor (AS x Vc). 
However, over the historical development of the air transport industry, these 
figures necessarily understate and provide a lower bound estimate for the extra­
ordinary qualitative transition which the industry has experienced over this same 
span of time.- Dimensions such- as range of aircraft, aircraft ride quality, all 
weather operations, noise and other amenity factors, and safety improvements, are 
at best very inadequately reflected in the numerical data on direct operating 
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costs (even since speed is not fully reflected in conventional productivity 
measures, since such measures do not really incorporate greater passenger comfort 
and convenience). 
If, for example, a DC-3 had the same cost/passenger mile as a 707, we mould 
never be led to conclude that they are congruent vehicles. Some of these iprove­
ments can be quantitatively documented along other dimensions than cost. For 
example, aerodynamic efficiency, as measured by product of Mach number and lift 
divided by drag, which aggregates the results of several.particular technological 
developments such as increasing engine thrust, improved airfoil design, and so on, 
to the 707.1has increased over five-fold from the DC-S 
The trend of aerodynamic efficiency for several particular aircraft is 
documented in Fig. 9. Similarly, we can observe in Fig. 10 the substantial progress 
in noise abatement for turbine aircraft since their inception in 1958 to the present, 
where a reduction in the deciBel levels of take-off noise have dropped from over 
120 to about 93 in 1974 with the 747 aircraft. 2 These qualitative improvements 
that do not decrease drag or fuel consumption but increase weight such as noise 
reduction modifications to both the engine system and the aircraft undoubtedly 
add to the costs of operation and so would tend to counteract the secularly 
declining costs per available passenger seat mile. 
'Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, Document B-7210-2-418, Oct. 5, 1976, 
p. 3, and Fig. 6. 
21bid, p. 3 and Fig. 7. 
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Characteristics of Beta Innovation 
There are basically two types of activities within the beta phase of the 
innovative process which lead to the productivity gains we have witnessed above. 
One such activity may be categorized as "learning-by-doing." There is now 
a considerable body of literature describing the improvements in productivity 
which have been associated with learning to manufacture a newly conceived 
product. Indeed, in some circles the phenomenon is referred to as the "Horndal 
Effect," after the Swedish steelworks where, over a period of 15 years, output 
per man hour was observed to increase about Z%per year even though no changes 
had occurred in either the plant or production techniques. The phenomenon has. 
been further documented, not only in air-frame production, but in machine tools, 
as well. 1 ' 2 shipbuilding and textiles 
'A.Alchian, "Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production," Econometrica 
October 1963, pp. 679-92; Werner Hirsch, "Firm Progress Ratios," Econometrica,
 
April 1956, pp. 136-43; Leonard Rapping, "Learning and World War II Production
 
Functions, "Review of Economics and statistics," 1965, pp. 81-86; Paul David,

"Learning by Doing and Tariff Protection: A Reconsideration of the Case of the
 
Ante-Bellum U.S. Cotton Textile Industry," Journal of Economic History, Sept.
 
1970, pp. 521-601; Kenneth Arrow, 'The Economic Implications of Learning by
 
Doing," Review of Economic Studies, June 1962, pp. 155-73. According to Hirsch, 
the U.S. Air Force "for quite some time had recognized that the direct labor 
input per airframe declined substantially as cumulative airframe output went up. 
The Stanford Research Institute and the RAND Corporation initiated extensive 
studies in the late forties, and the early conclusions were that, insofar as 
World War II airframe data were concerned, doubling cumulative airframe output 
was accompanied by an average reduction in direct labor requirements of about 
20%. This meant that the average labor requirenent after doubling quantities 
of output was about 80% of what it had been before. Soon the aircraft industry 
began talking about the 'eighty percent curve'." Hirsch, op. cit., p. 136. 
It is possible, of course, that cost reductions which have een attributed to 
learning by doing have actually been due to other factors which have not been 
correctly identified, especially in cases where learning by doing has been 
defined as a residual. For earlier discussions of the learning curve in the 
aircraft industry, see Adolph Rohrbach, 'Economical Production of All-Metal 
Airplanes and Seaplanes," Journal of the Society of Automotive Enineers, 
January 1927, pp. 57-66, and T. P. Wright, "Factors Attecting the Cost of 
Airplanes," Journal of the Mronatieal Siences , February 1936, pp. 122-128. 
2Subsequent to the preparation of this paper, a reference to the learning curve
 
phenomena as applied to aircraft construction was discovered in a book by
 
Berghell entitled "Production Engineering in the Aircraft Industry" (see Chap XII 
pp. 166-198) that iwas written for the Engineering, Science, and Management War 
Training Program and published in 1944 by McGraw-Hill. 
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We wish to emphasize here, however, a different but related form of 
learning-by-doing. Not only does learning-by-doing take place in the manu­
facturing process as workers improve their skill in the making of the product, 
but, as a result of the actual use of the aircraft itself, a considerable 
learning process occurs which reduces the operating costs of the aircraft 
in use after its manufacture. Much of the learn-by-doing in aircraft has been 
associated with the gradually growing body of experience associated with the 
operation of a new model airplane. 1 The experience is, perhaps, most 
characteristic of complex final products with elaborately differentiated but 
interdependent component parts, and is therefore related to the complementarity 
phenomenon. Operating cost reductions, as we will see, depend heavily upon 
gradually learning more, during the actual operation of a new aircraft, about 
the performance characteristics of an airplane system and its components, and 
therefore understanding more clearly its eventual full potential. For example, 
it is only through extensive usage that detailed knowledge is developed about 
engine operation, their maintenance needs, their minimum servicing and overhaul 
requirements, etc. This is due partly to an inevitable--and highly desirable-­
overcautiousness on the part of the manufacturer in dealing with an untried 
product. As experience accumulates, it becomes possible to extend the operating 
life beyond original expectations. 
1A. parallel process, with wich we do not deal, is the extensive learning
which was inv6lved in the operation and management of an entire aircraft 
fleet. There were many operational problems for which optimal procedures
had to be developed--scheduling problems, turnaround time, dovetailing the 
requirements of equipment with those of personnel, etc. Such "software" 
responsibilities belong to the realm of management and not technology, although 
the two realms are obviously interrelated. 
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A point which deserves to be made explicit in all this is the persistent 
importance of uncertainty in the precision of prediction of performance in 
airplane design. In spite of elaborate possibilities for prior experimentation 
in wind tunnels of increasing sophistication and theoretical techniques of 
increasing precision in aerodynamic research, such things as scale effects 
and the phenomena of compressibility and turbulence continue to result in 
unexpected outcomes of a positive as well as negative nature. Sometimes 
performance exceeds expectations and sometimes there are unexpected benefits 
as well as unexpected problems. Wind tunnel tests in the past, for example, 
have resulted in exaggeration of the increase in drag, particularly at transonic 
speeds, and handling problems associated, for example, with a swept-back wing 
design. One must not exaggerate, therefore, the extent to which, even today, 
the design if aircraft can draw upon precise scientific methodology to achieve 
its ends. 1 
Secondly, we have the technological advances embodied in the hardware 
of the aircraft. One excellent means of gaining insight into how several 
complementary technological advances occur at uneven intervals is to describe 
the process as it occurs for a particular aircraft. We may consider the case 
history of the Douglas DC-8 as representative of this process of development. 
Several of the events in this history are summarized in Fig. 11. 
In the DC-8 we have an aircraft which has experienced a more than 50% 
reduction in operational energy costs over its life span on a per-seat-mile 
basis, as well as an increase in productivity (AS x Vc) from 62,500 or the DC8-10 
30 & 50, to 130,000 for the DC8-61-63 series, although the basic configuration 
has been largely unchanged and,, as we can see, the modifications have been 
relatively unsophisticated compared to differences between aircraft types. 
'taller, Ronald and David Sawers, The Technical Development of Modern Aircraft,
Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1968, pp. 246-250. See also our later discussion of 
wind tunnel technology. 
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Clearly, an important set of modifications has had to do with the engines, which 
have progressed both to increase available thrust and decrease specific fuel 
consumption, thus increasing the potential payload and directly reducing operating 
costs. At the same time, there have been modifications to the wing profile that 
reduce the drag of the aircraft. With the DC-8-30, a drooped flap was added, then 
a leading edge extension with the DC-8-50. Subsequent models increased the aspect 
ratio and repositioned the flap. 1 Engine pylon design also underwent some modifica­
tion. These variations on the aircraft's geometry were motivated by the drag. 
reduction and consequent increased fuel economy they were able to provide. But it 
is clear from the figure that a third very substantial contribution to increasing 
the aircraft productivity has been the ability to stretch the aircraft, increasing 
capacity from 123 seats up to 251 seats, thus demonstrating the large leverage to be 
reaped by increasing the internal passenger capacity, provided of course they can 
be operated sufficiently close to capacity. The interdependence of these tech­
nological improvements is perhaps obvious but requires explicit exposition.. The 
possibilities for stretching and consequently adding payload volume and weight 
to the vehicle depend upon having more powerful engines to meet the take-off 
incorporated in the wings to maintain approach and landing .speed as well. 
The story of the DC-8 is quite representative of the transport aircraft 
industry design philosophy. Innovations which have been incorporated within 
a particular vehicle and which have made substantial improvements in their 
operating cost characteristics predominantly have a good deal to do with engine 
development in terms of available thrust and fuel consumption capabilities, 
aWhile the modifications alter the aerodynamic parameters of the wing, sometimes 
substantially, the wing itself does not generally experience internal structural 
alterations. This is because of the prohibitively high cost of wing redesign
which makes it much more economical to modify the flaps, leading edge and wing
tips. At the same time, the possibility of eventually utilizing even these 
add-on devices must be anticipated to some degree during the initial wing
development stage. 
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with reduction in overall drag by modification in wing design, and with stretching 
of the vehicle to increase payload capability. Although the dramatic improvements 
in operating costs may initially appear to come directly from the stretching process,
 
this process is unattainable without the complementary developments of power plant 
technology and sometimes wing technology, themselves highly interdependent technol­
ogies. Engine technology in particular during the turbine era has experienced 
dramatic technological growth in terms of thrust per pound of engine weight, which 
has increased by over 50% in 20 years, but even more so in terms of fuel consumption
 
per hour per pound of thrust. For example, in1950, about 0.9 pounds of fuel were 
required for each hour-pound of thrust. By the early 1960's, this requirement, with 
the development of the turbo fans, dropped to around 0.75 pounds of fuel per hour­
pound of thrust. With the innovation of the high bypass turbo fans around 1968 and 
in use today, the fuel requirements dropped to 0.6 pounds of fuel per hour-pound of 
thrust. This 30% decline in fuel requirements over this period has direct implications 
for increasing the deliverable payload of aircraft within the turbine generation. 
1 
The phenomenon of stretching as applied to jet transports from the Comet 
to the 747 is a classic example of a process which is not very "interesting" 
technologically but is of vital economic importance. 2 To begin with, the 
process reflects the basic complementarity between the performance of the 
engine and the airframe. Indeed, there is little incentive to improve engine 
Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., op. cit. p. 4, and Fig. 4, reproduced herein as
 
Fig. 21.,
 
2The technique of stretching has a much older history and was applied with great
 
success to the DC6-DC7C series as well as the Lockheed 649 to 1049H1 series of
 
propeller driven aircraft. A well documented recent example of this technique
 
is shown in the case of the DC9 series aircraft in Business Week (pp. 95 &100,
 
Nov. 14, 1977) where the DC9 series has been increased in size by lengthening the
 
fuselage from 104.4 ft. (80 passengers) in 1965 to 147.8 ft. (155 passengers) in
 
1980 in five distinct steps. In additionj modifications to the wing and power
 
plant have enabled it to increase performance and keep abreast of the latest
 
noise regulations.
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design unless airframe designers know how to exploit the improvement. 1 The 
carrying capacity of the airplane depends, first of all on the capacity of 
the engines. As engine performance is improved, exploitation of the potential 
requires redesign or modification of the airframe. The simplest response, as 
improved engines become available, is merely to stretch the fuselages and add 
more seats. Indeed, as this phenomenon came to be better understood, most air­
planes were deliberately designed in order to facilitate subsequent stretching. 
Although airplane designers at any time design to conform to the capacity of 
the engines, it is generally understood that improved and increased performance 
engines will be coming along within the lifetime of the model, and it is 
important to be in a position to exploit them. Since designers expect these 
future engine improvements (as well as other complementary technological 
improvements), they consciously attempt to design flexibility into the airplane. 
,This applies especially to the design of the fuselage in such a way as to 
facilitate later stretching. Such stretching has constituted an important 
'The role of highly specialized producers, and the question of what constitutes 
the optimum degree of specialization from the point of view of technological 
innovation, are highly important questions which are still not very well under­
stood. Specialist producers tend to be very good at improving, refining and 
modifying their specialized product. They-tend not to be very good at devising 
the new innovation which may constitute the eventual successor to their product. 
They tend, in other words, to work within an established regime, but they do 
not usually make the innovations which establish a new regime. Thus, the 
horse-and-buggy makers did not contribute significantly to the development of 
the automobile; the steam locomotive makers played no role in the introduction 
of the diesel, and indeed expressed a total disinterest, until it was finally 
entrepreneured by General Motors; and the makers of piston engines did not 
play a prominent role, in England, Germany or the United States in the 
development and introduction of the jet engine. The severely circumscribed 
technological horizons of specialized producers--to some extent an inevitable 
"occupational hazard"--may help to account for what one recent book on the 
aircraft industry describes as "... an apparent proclivity on the part of once 
successful manufacturers to remain too long with the basic technology of their 
original success." Almarin Phillips, op. cit., p. 91. The point is that inti­
mate familiarity with an existing teclmohlbcreates a strong disposition to 
work within that techmology, and to make further modifications leading to its 
improvement and not to its displacement.' Scribes may be expected to invent 
forms of shorthand, but not typewriters. However, if improved ones show up 
they will be adopted. 
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part of the productivity improvement which has been characteristic of the
 
beta phase. Stretching may, indeed, be thought of as the process by which, 
as a result of accumulated Imowledge and improved engine capabilities, the 
payload possibilities of a new airplane design are expanded to their fullest 
limits. Clearly, this is an economic as well as a technological phenomenon. 
When an original design is modified through the stretching process it is 
usually dictated by the growth of passenger demand or new route opportunities. 
A less current but no less poignant example of the process of technological 
advance is the closely interrelated set of innovations which culminated in the 
Boeing 247/DC-3 series of vehicles. These aircraft represent a qualitative 
advance over the previous types of aircraft. These changes were so organically 
interdependent with each other that it is impossible to identify the technological 
advance of the Boeing 247/DC-3 with any particular innovation. In fact, the 
interdependence of these advances is such that none of them individually would 
have resulted in the substantial technological advance realized by this 
pioneering airplane. Central innovations in this process were higher wing 
loading, twin-engine, all-metal cantilever wing and integral monocoque fuselage 
construction, retractable landing gear, engine cowlings, flaps, and adequate 
engine thrust coupled with variable pitch propellers, all used first by others. 
These interdependencies can be most easily associated through the categories 
of lift, drag, thrust, and velocity. One obvious means to increase payload is to 
increase weight lifted by the wing in up-and-away flight (increase wing loading) 
which, for a given vehicle, can be accomplished by flying faster (requiring 
increased engine power), increasing the lift as the velocity squared and by also 
increasing the lifting capability of the wing in the takeoff and landing condition 
to maintain the landing and takeoff speeds the same. This means an increase in 
usable 'as well as an increase in installed power. The increased power is required 
I is the maximun lifting capability expressed in coefficient fan; i.e.,lift/wing area x stream dynamic pressure. 
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to accelerate the aircraft to the desired take-off end velocity in the presence 
of the ground and climb over a 50-foot obstacle within a proscribed distance. 
Thus, a balance can be struck between wing area, CLmax and installed power to 
perform the takeaoff maneuver; the power required to cruise at the desired 
altitude being less than the maximum available power but within the minimm fuel 
consumption range. 
Because the power to cruise is directly proportional to the overall drag 
of the airplane in the' cruise configuration, any drag due to bumps, wires, 
landing gear, etc., not associated with lift must be minimized. The drag 
due to lift must be reduced also. The premium for reduced drag under 
this condition becomes substantial and was realized in the case of the B-247 
by the utilization of streamlined semi-monoque construction, higher wing loading, 
increase wing span, the use of a cowled engine, retractable landing gear, -and, 
in the case of the DC-I/DC-2, landing flaps as well to increase Cimax and hence 
cut down the landing speed. 
Another central problem in the design of aircraft which the DC-2-3 series 
addressed with substantially greater success than any of its predecessors was 
the difficulty of designing an aircraft which must function efficiently in 
different flight regimes of conflicting requirements. Not only must an air­
craft be efficient in its high-speed cruise configuration (low drag with flaps 
and gear up--engine throttled back) but obviously it must be able to operate 
effectively at low speed in landing and takeoff as well; this latter function 
being particularly sensitive to fuel consumption. Takeoff and landing on one 
hand, and cruising on the other, require different wing profile and engine 
operating conditions for optimm operation. For example, the high lift wing 
configuration required to takeoff results in an inordinately high drag in the 
cruise configuration. In addition, operation at altitudes above the expected 
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enroute terrain with one engine out required low overall drag as well as powerful 
low drag control surfaces. These factors were significantly resolved by the use 
of wing flaps, retractable landing gear, variable pitch propellers, and aero 
dynamically balanced control surfaces in the DC-3 generation of aircraft. So all 
these innovations came together to form the "modern airliner."' 
One interesting footnote to this process is that after the successful 
integration of these interdependent innovations in the DC-3, new difficulties 
arose as a result which had neither been present nor foreseen. With the 
improved lift-to-drag ratio characteristics of the basic airframe and the 
increased wing loadings being used the aircraft became difficult to land, due to 
the increased speed on the glide path, requiring a much flatter descent glide 
path which gave pilots less flexibility on landing maneuvers (less time to make 
corrections). In response to this need came a new control capability brought 
about over a span of several years by use of powerful flaps, adjustable stabilizers, 
controllable drag producing devices such as flap lip spoilers, reversible pitch 
propellers, and more closely balanced and trimable control surfaces. These, in 
o2 turn fed back to increase the efficiency of the aircraft in particular portions 
of the flight, such as takeoff, as well, perpetuating the process of unevenness 
D of technological complemntarity. These advances also led to increased effi­
o ~ ciency at high altitudes (flight at speeds close to that for maximum L/D), 
though until the innovation of pressurized cabins with the Boeing 307, these 
efficiencies were unavailable to normal civilian air transport operation. 
2 
ISee Miller & Sawers, op tit, p. 47-52 and Phillips, op cit, p. 115-126. 
2The pressurized cabin, by making it possible to fly higher, was thus a 
tremendous boon. The DC-4, unpressurized, flew at around 10,000 feet. 
Pressurization raised flying altitudes to about 22,000 feet. Jets, 
eventually, made it possible to go up to 35,000 or 40,000 feet and thus 
to fly above the weather. This, coupled with strong identification radar, 
represented an immense improvement in efficiency, reliability and comfort. 
As flying altitudes increased, improvements in meteorological knowledge 
made a further contribution to transport efficiency. Information concerning 
the precise location of jet streams derived from photographic iweatle 
satellites, were increasingly valuatle, especially on long-range filt 
. 
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Power Plant Maintenance 
Proper power plant operation requires an extensive maintenance effort and in 
the case of the radial (reciprocating) engines resulted in complete overhaul after 
a specific time interval. In the case of the jet engine which is subsequently dis­
cussed herein, this interval began based on the experience with reciprocating engines 
and was extended as experience was gained.
 
Powerplant maintenance provides an additional excellent case study for the 
process of beta innovation which combines significant measures of both learning 
by doing and complementary hardware innovation. Improvement in maintenance 
characteristics of the propulsion system has very substantial implications for 
reducing the operating cost of aircraft systems. 1 Overall maintenance comprises 
typically 30% of all direct operating aircraft costs of labor and materials. Even 
this tends to understate the overall impact, since the ppportunity cost of lost 
revenues due to unscheduled maintenance requirenents may be substantial as well. 
For example, at American Airlines, over a 37-month period between 1972 and 1975, 
maintenance problems accounted for an average of 21% of all delay costs, reaching 
an annual average of over $8 million per annum in lost delay costs attributed to 
maintenance.2 In terms of direct operating costs, maintenance costs for current
 
jet vehicles are roughly equal between airframe and propulsion systems, though 
the activities are somewhat differentiated in that airframe maintenance is more 
labor-intensive than engine maintenance. 
An additional reason that powerplant maintenance technologies are particularly 
instructive for our purposes is that while we can see from the above figures that 
1See NASA Document CR4134645, 'Economic Effects of Propulsion System Technology 
on Existing andFuture Traiisport Aircraft," 1974, particularly Section II. 
2See NASA Dociment RFP 1-15-5595, NAS 1-14284, "The Impact of Technology dn
 
Operating Economics of Existing and Future Transport Aircraft," 1976,
 
pp. M760816-19.
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this activity is an important factor and a significant contribution to relative 
operational costs, it is at the same time virtually invisible in terms of actual 
flight technology. Maintenance technology develops in the shop away from the 
actual aircraft in their flight environments and often advances in terms of 
Imowledge and hardware technology independent of the flight configuration itself, 
though of course, maintenance considerations substantially effect the design 
of flight configurations as well. The increasing trend towards design integration 
and modular construction of major flight components such as the propulsion system 
is largely in response to the increased efficiency this affords the maintenance 
activity. 
Another substantial contribution to cost reduction in the maintenance activity 
is the apparent economies of scale. Airline companies find it economical to 
concentrate maintenance activity in order to capture the scale economies from 
such facilities. This scale economy apparently outweighs the increased expense 
of routing each vehicle in the fleet periodically to the maintenance base (for 
example, the facility that United Airlines maintains in San Francisco and that 
American Airlines maintains in Tulsa). 
The phenomenon which we seek to understand quantitatively bears a strong 
general resemblance to the intra-generational cost reduction advances for 
aircraft as a whole as described above. A typical cost of engine maintenance 
schedule is presented in Fig. 12, together with the particular trajectory for 
the Pratt Whitney JT3D turbojet engine. 1 The rise of maintenance costs 
during the first year of introduction reflects the impact of early design 
problems which were not anticipated prior to the rigors encountered during 
actual on-line operations. 
See NASA Document CR-134645, op. cit., Section II, Fig. II-1. 
In the particular case of the JT3D, the design difficulties remedied 
through maintenance involved inordinate wear of parts due to high operating 
temperatures relative to the thermal stability of the lubricants used. After 
this point, the costs reflect a strong downward trend during which the mainte­
nance costs dropped to typically 30% of initial levels over a decade of operation. 
It is the determinants of this cost reduction, the beta phase relative to the alpha 
technology of a newly introduced engine, which we seek to understand. 
Of course, the two phases cannot be strictly separated in their entirety. 
Just as some design problems such as the lubrication difficulties of the JT3D 
get solved under the guise of maintenance, so are maintenance aspects of the 
future engine carefully examined and prepared during the design phase of the 
engine. This activity includes preparation of instruction manuals, tools for 
repair, ordering and inventorying of spare parts, personnel training, and so on. 
All of this represents complementary, though simultaneous, technological advance 
with respect to the introduction of the new engine. 
But there is also apparently in terms of cost effectiveness a broad meniu 
of carplementary technologies which cannot be anticipated during the design 
states of the propulsion system. It is these small but cumulAtive technological 
contributions which result in the cost profile of Figure 4 which we seek to 
understand. One of the more striking aspects of this technological development 
is that, to a surprisingly large extent, it is not readily identified with 
particular new and innovative hardware configurations. Rather, the maintenance 
history of particular engines, especially the turbojet generation, reflects a 
very strong "learning by using" dimension, where prior knowledge based upon 
reciprocating propeller engines was largely iadequate to anticipate the 
durability and reliability of the gas turbine engines (indeed, that earlier 
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experience turned out to be positively misleading). This was further 
exacerbated by the :fact that jet maintenance occurred first in the military, 
where cost considerations were not of overriding significance, and these pro­
cedures were necessarily modified to conform to the more explicitly commercial 
constraints of the civilian sector. 
-This phenomenon is clearly reflected in the history of the maintenance 
philosophies of the airlines, in conjunction with recomendations of engine 
manufacturers and requirements of the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). It has 
often been the resolution of the conflicting concerns of these groups which has 
led to substantial adjustments of the maintenance activity. Basically, engine 
manufacturers are conmissioned to design equipment which on the one hand can be 
operated profitably by the airlines and on the other hand meets or surpasses 
the safety requirements imposed by the FAA. 
It is the latter, based upon the experience of reciprocating engines which, 
with the advent of gas turbines, led to systematic underestimation of reliability. 
For example, the early maintenance programs were based upon specifications of 
allowable time between overhauls (TBO's) measured in hours of operating time. 
These were strictly enforced and only extendable in increments of 200 hours 
and this only after relatively extensive testing over a sample of several 
devices. While this was perhaps justified initially due to the safety consider­
ation and the ignorance of the capabilities of the new technology, these 
programs were excessively expensive since unnecessary maintenance work was 
being undertaken at excessively short intervals between overhaul. 
When this was realized, the next stage was a modified TBO program which 
removed the obligatory disassembly conditional upon various tests and inspections. 
This situation has further evolved to the current situation where there are no 
mandatory schedules for reconditioning, this taking place as indicated by 
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routine tests which can be performed while the aircraft remains "in-line." 
Such examinations include the use of borescopes to check wear, analysis of 
used lubricants, and visual examination. At a less critical level, this 
trend was also in evidence. For example, in the case of the Boeing 707, 
inspections which were initially required on a daily basis have been stretched 
to routine weekly surveillance. I out 
The increased aircraft availability resulting from this improved maintenance 
scheduling is clearly much more a matter of familiarity with the hardware than 
technological advances newly embodied in the hardware. However, there have been 
clear implications for the engine hardware resulting from the learning-by-using 
process we have described. Regarding the engine itself, providing maintenance 
on a need-only basis quickly pinpoints the factors which limit durability. 
This has resulted in redesign effort focussed upon these elements. Further, 
since it is no longer necessary to recondition an engine as a complete unit, 
the cost reduction advantages available from interchangeable modularity have 
been more readily exploitable. In addition, there has resulted significant 
technological advances in the diagnostic hardware used to ascertain the 
advisability of maintenance. For example, mote sophisticated borescopes using 
television transmitters for monitoring, internal accelerometers to monitor 
vibrations, and the use of isotope pellets to detect metal fatigue and stress 
have all been introduced in the diagnostic phase of maintenance. 
This change from a very conservative preventive maintenance program to 
one based upon diagnostic parameters is reflected in the statistics regarding 
the frequency of engine removals with respect to operating times, as shown 
in Fig. 13. Even within the new diagnostic maintenance regime, there is for 
several years a declining trend of engine removals for maintenance and repair. 
'Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company, op. cit., p. 3. 
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This is shown in Fig. 14, where a decline is noted for each of the first 10 
years. After this, the engines reach the durability limits of major structural 
members, thus requiring increasingly frequent removal in the later years. 
Again, this understates the full impact of this new maintenance schedule 
program, since it does not include the substantial opportunity costs no 
longer foregone when aircraft must be pulled out of service for frequent but
 
unnecessary maintenance. The significantly decreased down times permitted by 
the new programs keep the vehicles in revenue-producing service for a higher 
proportion of the aircraft's lifetime. The result of course is a significant
 
increase in the output/capital ratio for the aircraft. 
Finally, it is notable that the learning by using and associated comple­
mentary technologies dominate, with respect to costs, the trend towards higher 
costs of each repair for aircraft over their lifetime, which has risen as 
indicated by Fig. 15. There are several forces at work here, some of which 
tend to lower costs/per repair and others which raise these expenses, though 
the latter clearly dominate. The major determinant here actually again includes 
more design than maintenance, though since it occurs after the device is on line, 
the activity takes place formally'within maintenance. If there are maintenance 
problems with major structural elements, and these certainly increase in frequency 
as the engine ages, then there is substantial motivation to redesign these members 
for increased reliability and durability, rather than simple replacement out of 
stocks.
 
Propulsion system maintenance thus provides a less than obvious and 
certainly nontrivial case study of how accumulating complementary technological 
advances are responsible for significant cost decrease and increased item 
availability, helping to fully realize the potential introduced by a radically 
new major innovation such as turbojet engines. This source of drastically 
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improved economic efficiency isnot a new one; rather, ithas long characterized
 
the process by which the air transport industry has accommodated itself to the
 
availability of new and untried equipment. Indeed, one authority on the
 
ihdustry has estimated that, between 1920 and 1936, engine maintenance costs
 
of radial reciprocating engines fell by fully 80% and constituted the largest
 
contribution which the engine manufacturer made to the development of air
 
.1 transport at that time. The contribution, however, as we have emphasized,
 
was not and could not have been made by the engine manufacturer alone, but 
was possible only in conjunction with the leafning by using of the air transport 
carriers. This effect has been carried on into the jet transport application
 
as well.
 
Characteristics of Alpha Innovation
 
Undoubtedly a significant reason that such a large portion of operating 
cost decreases are experienced during the beta rather than the alpha phase 
reflects some of the striking and unique aspects of the alpha phase of airline 
technology itself. The whole development process for aircraft has certainly 
gone through a major transition from the early days when "build it and test it" 
was the dominant and perhaps only feasible developmental strategy. This sufficed
 
in large part right up through the DC-3 series which flew first as a single DC-l
 
prototype and subsequently as the limited edition DC-2. However, to follow this
 
linear strategy of development today would be much more difficult, given the 
complexity and scale of modern vehicles, in addition to the economic infeasibility 
and the high risk of obsolescence which would impact the prototype if not those 
on the drawing board.
 
1Miller and Sawers, ap. cit., p. 89.
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The increased complexity of individual aircraft is clearly reflected in 
the time intervening between a vehicle's conception and its delivery to the 
air transport industry.1 We can readily see this trend for the several genera­
tions in Fig. 16. What began with as little as six months' development time in 
1917 has expanded several-fold to where the time required to develop a modern 
jetliner from conception to tested flight and delivery can take up to seven 
or eight years. This trend not only reflects particular aircraft, but classes
 
of aircraft as well with the more complex technologies of more recent generation
 
requiring an expanded alpha phase as well. 
The earlier point of obsolescence on the drawing board isalso strongly
 
corroborated by Fig. 16. With development periods extending to eight years 
while new aircraft are coming on line much more frequently clearly underscores 
this point. 
There are two particular processes pertaining to the alpha phase of aircraft 
development which are helpful in characterizing this process. First is the activity 
of pre-flight aerodynamic testing, and second is the transfer of technology from 
military to civil aircraft.
 
The central element in pre-flight testing has been the wind tunnel, and 
a sketch of its historical development and use captures many significant aspects 
of the alpha phase technological process. From the days of the Wright Brothers 
the wind tunnel has been used as part of the design process, to study the aero­
dynamic characteristics of a scale model of the proposed airplane as well as to 
study effects of air flow on component parts such as airfoils, struts, wires, 
fuselages and propellers. From this information the form and the performance of 
1A vehicle is conceived in terms of extant technology. If we include the time 
required for the development of the technology, then the total delays are 
typically double those between conception and first service. 
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the aircraft was predicted. The designer has relied on the results of wind tunnel 
tests to check his calculations and to provide insight into what might be done to 
improve the performance of the specific design under consideration. 'When these 
calculations did not agree with what was expected; i.e., predicted high speed, 
stalling speed, or take-off distance, concern was raised as to what part of the 
design process was amiss. 
During W1I the Germans, the French, and the English used wind tunnels 
1 
' 
2 
' 
3 
to research and develop airfoil profiles and aircraft configurations, the British 
using a closed-throat open-circuit type (NPL), the French an open-throat open­
circuit type (EIFFEL), and the Germans under Prandtl developed a return-circuit 
open-throat wind tunnel. Because of the differences in size between the models 
used in the wind tunnel and the difficulties in making precise measurements of 
aircraft performance in flight, emphasis was placed on obtaining wind tunnels 
that would more accurately represent the conditions of full scale flight. 
Subsequently, wind tunnels of larger size and greater speed were developed in the 
late 20's and early S0's to cope with the problem of more effectively representing 
true conditions of flight. Because most of the problems associated with aircraft 
development occurred in the lower end of the speed regime such as take-off and 
landing, special emphasis was made to construct testing devices that would cover 
the speed range of full sized airplanes at true flight speeds. This can be done 
in two ways, one by building a wind tunnel in which a full size aircraft can be 
placed in wind velocity equal to that expected, or by building a scale model of 
the aircraft under study, placing it in a wind tunnel of smaller size and using 
3 Mllikan, C. B., Aerodynamics of the Airplane, John Wiley Sons, Inc., 
N.Y., N.Y., 1941, p. 10-17. 
%ankhurst, R. C., Holden, D. W., Wind-Timnel Technique,
 
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1952.
 
3 pope, Alan, Wind Thnnel Testing, John Wiley & Sons, N.Y., N.Y., 1947. 
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the laws of similitude determined by dimensional analysis calculate the expected 
forces to be encountered with a full size airplane. By such analysis the forces 
on the aircraft may be written
 
F =C 1/2 p V2S where C = CF(RA)
 
and p = density
 
V = velocity 
S = Reference area 
R = Reynolds No. = 
Inertia Force = p_ V 
Viscous Force i 
M = Mach No. - Inertia Force _ V/aElastic Force
 
and the Coefficient C is a pure number based on the 
Reynolds Nunber and Mach Number of the fluid. 
For low Mach numbers the coefficient C does not change with R and the forces 
are a function of size (S) and dynamic pressure oV22 
Because it is less costly to test with smaller scale models, the first wind 
tunnels were much smaller than the full size aircraft. For a period of time in 
the 1920's, it was felt sufficient to extrapolate the effects of small size (scale) 
tests to true flight speeds (full scale) by use of tests conducted in a special 
device known as a variable density wind tunnel where the pressure in the stream 
is increased by a factor up to 20. Much work was done with such a device to define 
and develop optimum airfoil sections in the 1920's and 30's. This method, 
however, developed a high turbulence in the airstream and confused the results, 
so the modern pressure tunnels are specially constructed to minimize this turbu­
lence by placement of screens in the settling chambers before the working section 
to break up the eddys in the. stream. In addition, the model size was very small 
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and it has been found more convenient to work with a model of about 7-10-ft. span 
or go to full size. The first large wind tunnel used in the U.S. was the Propeller 
Research Tunnel at Langley Field, Virginia, where the NACA cowl was developed 
during its period of checkout, before the propeller dynamometer was available. 
Subsequently, the work leading to the optimum placing of nacelles on wings was 
started here. Because of the success of this work, the full scale wind tunnel 
with a working section (throat size) of 30x60 ft. was constructed at Langley to 
study aerodynamic characteristics of full sized aircraft. Itproved such a
 
success that a larger full-scale wind tunnel was constructed at Ames (size 40x80 ft.) 
during WVII. It can test full size aircraft up to a span of 72 feet at speeds up 
to 235 mph. 
Because the speed and size of aircraft increased rapidly, the influence 
of Mach number began to dominate the performance characteristics of aircraft and 
1,hence the testing scene. 1 2 These effects occurred first in propeller design, 
with the advent of jet driven machines the possibility of exceeding the speed 
of sound existed and emphasis was placed on both high subsonic and low supersonic 
testing arrangements. 
As an example of uneven technology itself, the ability to build large 
scale and high speed aircraft has always outstripped the ability of designers 
to provide complete pre-flight tests of these vehicles. This reached such 
proportions in the late 1940's and early 50's that before the development of 
the slotted throat transonic wind tunnel, tests for aircraft in the transonic 
region were conducted by the wing flow techniques; i.e., strapping models onto 
available high speed aircraft which then flew at high speeds to sense aerodynamic 
kope, Alan, and Harper, John J., Low Speed Wind Tunnel Testing, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969. 
2 pope, Alan, and Goin, Kenneth L., High Speed Wind Tunnel Testing, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. 
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performance.I The whole series of experimental 'gX-type"I aircraft during this
 
period derived from the inability to simulate adequately the transonic environment
 
inwhich new aircraft must traverse if they were to fly at supersonic speeds.
 
As a consequence of this unevenness between aircraft design goals and test
 
capability, the design procedure, particularly in the case of transonic aircraft,
 
can be an intuitive and uncertain task, and one which isoften unverified prior to'
 
flying of prototype units. The design process issomewhat conservative to avoid
 
the penalties of underperformance, with the result that delivered aircraft are
 
often capable of improved performance following acceptance flight testing with
 
only relatively slight design modifications. This inherent capacity for improve­
ment seems to be an important determinant of the so-called "stretching" process
 
discussed previously.
 
The strong historical trend has been towards aircraft with higher Reynolds
 
numbers; vehicles have become larger and faster. This trend is slightly
 
compensated by the offsetting trend towards higher altitude flight where the
 
atmosphere density declines accordingly. The most recent innovations inwind
 
tunnel testing are being included inthe National Transonic Facility, which
 
embodies both the ability to pressurize and cool the airstream and to accelerate
 
This raises the test Reynolds number substantially.
2
 
it to sonic velocities. 

Velocities around Mach 1.0 are quite important for the high speed, subsonic
 
transport aircraft since they not only approach this velocity themselves, but
 
'The problems of Reynolds number flow modeling have been greatest inthe transonic
 
flow regions. Subsonic flows are critical inhigh angles of attack experienced
 
during takeoff and landing, and have been addressed by the large-scale subsonic
 
tunnels available for some time now. On the other hand, supersonic cruise simula­
tions are quite accurately and satisfactorily addressed using small-scale modeling.
 
However, at transonic speeds the airflow over wings becomes an extremely compli­
cated combination of interacting flow fields. Due to the inability of extant test
 
facilities to generate the requisite Reynolds numbers for these transonic simula­
tions, there have been a few serious and costly surprises; for example, the C-141 
and the C-SA transport aircraft. See J. L.Jones, The Transonic Reynolds Number 
Problem, NASA Ames, Moffett Field, CA, 1976. 
2See Jones op. cit., pp. 9-13.
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sectional airflow over subsonic. surfaces can and do exceed the speed of sound. 
Figure 17 shows the various design parameters for various aircraft types which 
are sensitive to Reynolds number. The importance of obtaining this data at 
early design stages is suggested by the data in Figure 18, where devices such 
as supercritical airfoils and vortex diffusers which have critical transonic 
dynamics can have substantial impact upon the economies of subsonic transport 
aircraft. 
To underscore the several trends and unevenness of development suggested 
by testing technology, we may refer to Figure 19. First we confirm that the 
general undeniable trend is to aircraft innovation resulting in increasing 
flight Reynolds numbers. Perhaps most striking is the inability of extant 
facilities to achieve the full Reynolds number environment for aircraft sub­
sequent to the DC-3 generation of vehicles. Since the 1930's, tests have fallen 
increasingly short of requirements, and designers have accordingly had to rely 
increasingly upon extrapolations from available, limited facilities, and data 
from previously designed aircraft which have already flown. This not only. 
creates an environment of uncertainty around certain ongoing design proceedings, 
but also induces designers not to deviate substantially from previous successful 
designs, thus attenuating the potential for radical design improvements which 
provide such a fertile medium for complementary, less radical technological advances 
which we have seen are responsible for the substantial gain in air transport 
productivity. This uncertainty can increase the time required for the design 
and development process while redundant information is collected and analyzed. 
This uncertainty can be reduced to some extent by rapid analysis and interpretation 
of the wind tunnel data by use of modern digital computer techniques. In addition, 
progress has been made in calculating the flow fields about arbitrary wings and 
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bodies in nonviscous compressible flows and that some promise exists to reduce 
the use of wind tunnels in the aeronautical design process 1 ' 2 . Although some 
feel 3 that the large-scale digital computer could completely supplant the wind 
tunnel in this design process, it is too early to see if this is really true, 
especially in representation of the complex flow fields near a Mach number of 1.0 
and slightly above or accounting for the effects of high Reynolds number flow 
(flow viscosity). Finally, we can see from Fig. 19 the unevenness of design within 
wind tunnel technology itself, since the now-being-constructed NTF represents such 
a large gain in capability over its predecessors with no intermediate capability 
facilities being constructed in the intervening years. But an excursion into this 
testing technology, instructive as that would be at this juncture, leads us too 
far afield from our central focus upon productivity increases in the air transport 
industry. 4 
Another aspect of the alpha phase of the innovation process which is being 
included in the initial design process is the whole dynamics of aircraft-pilot 
.interface problem (or in other terms the provision of adequate flying qualities). 
As the improved performance capabilities of new aircraft have made this interface 
1The Aerodynamic Analyses Requiring Advanced Computers, Vols I & II,
 
A compilation of papers presented at a Conference held at Langley Research
 
Center, Hampton, VA, March 4-6, 1975. NASA SP-347.
 
2 Gessow, Alfred, and Morris, Dana J., A Survey of Computational Aerodynamics
 
in the United States, NASA SP-394, Wash., D. C., 1977.
 
3 Chapman, Dean R., Mark, Hans, and Pirtle, M. W., Computer vs. Wind Tunnels
 
for Aerodynamic Flow Simulations, Astronautics and Aeronautics, April 1975,
 
pp. 22-35.
 
4But see, for example, Miller Sawers, op. cit., pp. 168-175, 246-250.
 
5Gilruth, R. R., Requirements for Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes,
 
NACA-Washington, D. C., Rept. No. 755-1943.
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increasingly critical, there has been greater stress laid upon the human engineer­
ing aspects of the design of both aircraft control, hardware and software, 
especially since irreversible servo driven control surfaces have been used. 
Consequently, aspects of the aircraft's suitability for human control (and the 
effectiveness of that control) which were somewhat uncertain prior to actual 
test flight, can now be largely anticipated before design configurations are 
embodied in equipment - by the expanding use of flight simulators, for example. 
1&2 
Much of the technological development leading to increased innovation of 
commercial transport aircraft originated with military vehicles, where the 
central innovations were first made and then transferred, with important adap z 
3
tation, to commercial aircraft. This was conspicuously the case with the 
development of turbojet powered vehicles. Jets with both straight and swept 
back wings were introduced among military fleets some years prior to their 
delivery to airlines in present transport configuration. However, it should be 
recognized that the civil and military sectors have different concerns and criteria 
-which, in spite of considerable overlapping, impose limits to the transfer of design 
and innovation between them. The civil sector, for example, places great emphasis 
upon coimercially-based considerations such as economy of cost in operation, relia­
bility, and long useful life-- criteria which are not so overriding in the military 
'Belsley, S. E., Man Machine System Simulation for Flight Vehicles - See
 
References, IEEE Transactions of the Prof. Tech. Group on Human Factors in
 
Electronics, Vol. HFE-4, #1, Sept. 1963.
 
kavies, D. P.: Approval of Flight Simulator Flying Qualities, Aero. Jour., 
July 1975, p. 281-297.
 
"Paulisick, J. D., R&D Contributions to Aviation Progress (RADCAP). Vol. I,
 
Sumary Rept. (Air Force Dept.) Aug. 1972, NASACR-129572, Sup. 11-5.
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sector, where there is an overwhelming (but not exclusive) concern with certain 
kinds of performance characteristics. -
When a transfer of technology takes place from the military to civil facilities, 
it should not be too surprising that the success of the transfer is highly dependent 
upon important secondary technological advances which render the military tech­
nologies economically desirable for civil utilization, thus underscoring still
 
another unevenness in the historical development of air transport technology. 
The reasons for this have mostly to do with the design objectives of the users 
of aircraft. Whereas, for civil aircraft, all focus is upon the "bottom line" 
of profitability and consequently innovation which increases productivity and 
lower costs. This emerges as a rather secondary concern of military designers. 
The latter are far more interested in performance characteristics such as 
maneuverability, range, effective altitude, climbing and diving rates, acceleration, 
etc., than in how much it costs to achieve these objectives, though, ceteris 
paribus the cheapest configuration is of course pursued. Still, these performance 
,characteristics, while of little value to comnercial aviation, do little in the 
first instance to reduce operational costs and indeed are more likely to result in 
a deterioration of civil measures such as costs per available seat mile of opera­
tion. This no doubt goes a long way though not the whole way to explain the 
'Miller & Sawers in fact suggest that the heavy reliance upon government funds has 
had a seriously debilitating effect upon the airplane industry, at least in certain 
respects. "Lavish government spending on the products and research of the industry 
may have been a mixed blessing, for it may well have helped to inflate the develop­
ment and production costs of airliners by accustoming manufacturers to eitravagant 
ways (when firms could build new and elaborate research laboratories to prove to 
the government that they were able to carry out its research contracts, this 
extravagance was genuine enough). Engineers accustomed to such circumstances might 
find it difficult to place the same emphasis on the cost of their work as their 
poverty-striken predecessors did in the 1930's. Dependence on the government has 
thus been a mixed blessing for the aircraft industry; it has been given the jet 
engine, and lavished with other gifts, but they have weakened the comnercial and 
engineering instincts which helped the industry to take the first great step 
forward in airlines design in the 1930's. Its second leap forward might have been 
a bigger one if it had been less dependent on the government, but it could do 
nothing without the goverment's gifts. That is the paradox of the jet airliner's 
origins." Miller &Sawers, op. cit., p. 157. 
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intervening time between adoption of innovation by military vehicles and the 
eventual introduction into civil transport aircraft, as in the decade that 
separated jet tactical vehicles from the Boeing 707. For example, the first 
economically viable jet engines for civil transport used about 0.9 pounds of 
fuel per-hour-pound of thrust, and this has subsequently improved to around 0.6 
pounds of fuel per hour-pound of thrust (see Fig. 20). In contrast, the J-35 
engines used in the military B-47 bombers, which preceded the introduction of 
civil jet aircraft, required about 1.075 pounds of fuel per hour-pound of thrust 
as well as suffering from substantially less installed thrust. We have already 
noted the differences in maintenance philosophies and their economic consequences. 
We can achieve some idea of the quantitative dimension of the process from 
Figures 21a through 21i, which provide information upon the length of time 
separating the availability of innovation from the incorporation in civil transport 
airplanes. 1 ' 2 Many of these innovations originated in the process of designing and 
building military aircraft, though of course many others did not. However, what 
uniformly impedes their application is their anticipated or realized failure to 
improve the productivity profiles of civil aircraft. Although many of these 
innovations have found their way into civil application, no doubttechnological 
because they become economically desirable when used in conjunction with subse­
quently developed complementary technologies, many of them remain on the shelf 
after more than 30 years of technical feasibility. Of the total sample of 550 
advances, only 312, or less than 60% have found their way into 'application. 
Broken down by type of technology, this ranges from a low of 46% of aerodynamic, 
innovation achieving implementation to a high of 84% of technological advances
 
in avionics being economically desirable for implementation on civil vehicles.
 
'joint Department of Transportation-NASA Civil Aviation R&D Policy Study TST-30,
 
A Historical Study of the Benefits Derived from Application of Technical
 
Advances to Civil Aviation, 1971, Vol. I. AppendX B.
 
2See also Miller & Sawers, p. 226.
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Of course, this is not to say that innovations which have been adopted by civil 
aviation are superfluous to the advancement of this segment of the aircraft 
industry. Rather, our earlier arguments of the unevenness of technological and 
productivity development within the industry suggests that it is quite likely 
that these now dormant technologies will eventually be embodied by civil air 
transport vehicles. 
However, before this is possible it is necessary that complementary tech­
nologies be developed which render the extant potential technologies economically 
desirable as well as technologically feasible. 
We have placed great stress inthis paper upon the role of complementarities
 
in the operation of aircraft and have focused in particular upon the interrelations 
between the engine and the airframe, emphasizing in particular how improvements in 
one have required improvements in the other. If time and space permitted we could 
show how similar relationships of complementarity have played a critical role 
elsewhere. As Walter Vincenti of Stanford University has shown in an unpublished 
article, in the earlier history of the industry there was an intimate relationship 
between gradual and often quite inconspicuous improvements in the design of propellers 
and the subsequent need to modify the design of the airframe. 1 There was a continu­
ous and reciprocal interaction between improvements in fuels and new reciprocating 
engine design. The requirements for the engine in the form of increased performance 
and increased reliability improvements have demanded improved fuels for their full 
exploitation, and the availability of these improved fuels have on the other hand 
made it evident that existing engines could be further extended to take advantage 
of the full capabilities of the new fuel. Thus, there has been an interplay 
between the reciprocating engine builders and suppliers of fuel, 2 the outcome of 
'alter Vincenti, "Air-Propeller Tests of W. F. Durand and E. P. Lesley: A Case
 
Study in Technological Methodology," unpublished manuscript, 1976, pp. 6-7.
 
2See Robert Schlaifer and S. D. Heron, Development of Aircraft Enines and Fuels
 
Cambridge: Division of -Research, Graduate Scool of Business Administration
 
Harvard University, 1950, pp. 552, 558-9.
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which has been progressive improvement through the utilization of each advance in 
engine and fuel performance. 
1 
For gas turbine engines, the interaction between fuel and output are not as 
dramatic; in fact, the gas turbine, once running, is very forgiving about the 
fuel type used. The increases in jet engine output are generally associated 
with improved -compressor design and improved turbine materials to allow higher 
turbine inlet temperature operation. Further thrust increases and reductions 
in fuel consumption are brought about by introduction of turbo fan engines, 
-wherein increasingly larger amounts of compressor air by-pass the turbine and 
increase thrust. These progressions are shown on Fig. 20.
 
The role of metallurgical and, more broadly, materials improvements has been 
neglected in this paper, but such improvements have been fundamental to the 
growing progress of aircraft. In this respect, technological progress in 
aviation has been heavily dependent upon technological improvements elsewhere. 
In particular, the development of new, high performance alloys has been critical 
in the enhanced performance capabilities of both the engine and the airframe. 
In this respect, therefore, an appreciation of the sources of productivity 
growth in aircraft requires that we look beyond that industry alone and examine 
the role of interindustry relationships. Such interindustry interdependencies 
have by no means been confined to the aircraft industry. Rather, they are 
becoming increasingly characteristic of the -"ightechnology" sectors of the 
economy. The need for new metallurgical inputs in aviation provided the induce­
ment for technological improvements which subsequently turned out to be useful 
in many places other than aviation. Moreover, this has proved to be a two-way 
1Boeing Comnercial Airplane Company. op. cit., p. 3 and Fig. 4. Also
 
Schalifer and Heron, op. cit., especially Part II, Ch. 7.
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street. Z: terials improvements originating outside the industry often proved 
to be of great value in the production of aircraft, but materials developed 
originally in the aircraft industry also proved to be valuable to other indus­
tries. What has been asserted with respect to materials here is true of a 
wider range of devices and techniques (See Figs. 22 & 23 for an example of the 
types of complementaries. These tables are nowhere complete.). 1 Similar 
statements could be made with respect to a whole range of electronic devices 
and techniques in recent years. 
One particularly significant aspect of an investigation of these complementary 
technologies is the introduction and explanation of the notion of cost reductions 
through "learning by using" in the air transport industry. Indeed, this is the 
key insight for penetrating the unfolding of a diverse set of technological 
advances, from the immediately observable stretching of the vehicles to the 
considerably less obvious but no less significant cost reduction gains achieved 
in the aircraft maintenance shops. The richness of the explanatory power of 
this learning-by-using category in this particular industry, moreover, may be 
very useful for understanding the origins of cost reduction improvement with 
other high technology industries. 
'Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, op. cir. p. 3 and Fig. 4. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
The air transport industry of the U.S. and the world has expanded because 
of the increases in utility, productivity and reduced cost to the user, and the 
stimulation afforded, at least in the U.S., by direct government subsidy to the 
airline operators at the outset. The utility of the aircraft has resulted in 
decreased block times, increased ranges, increased comfort (flight at higher 
altitudes resulting in smoother flights; i.e., over the weather) and closer 
adherence to schedule. The productivity of the aircraft; that is, the ability to 
carry more passengers per plane faster over the route (seats x Vc) has increased 
with most of the new aircraft introduced and with every aircraft stretch. Along 
with-this productivity increase has, come a reduction in direct operating cost per 
seat mile, increased reliability, and increases in useable life of the aircraft. 
In addition, the air transport system has gone out of its way to entice and 
accomnodate passengers. 
The technology to enable the aircraft manufacturers and the airlines to 
affect these advances has been put together in different ways by the different 
manufacturers and as one would expect, with different end results--yet with some 
degree of similarity. A cursory examination of the way the industry developed in 
a technological sense indicates that aircraft development comes in waves, each 
wave encompassing several new technological advances while retaining the best 
of the old ones. A more careful examination of these waves of progress shows 
that they can be readily interpreted in terms of the alpha and beta phases 
proposed by Enos. The alpha phases are correlated with the introduction of new 
aircraft generations into service, the beta phases with the development of these 
generations to improve both the productivity (AS x Vc ) and the direct operating 
costs of each successive aircraft development. Following the mastery of the 
use of smooth 'stressed skin structural techniques (semimonoque structures) in 
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the early 1930's by the Aierican aircraft industry, coupled with fundamental 
work by the NACA on engine cowl design and optimum engine placement in the 
late 20's, the basic configurations have changed very little. Throughout the 
years to follow, however, improvements in engine systems, aerodynamic modifica­
tions and refinements (optimized airfoil profiles, swept wings and powerful 
leading- and trailing-edge flaps) -as well as structural design and manufacturing 
improvements and new materials have enabled advances in productivity and con­
current reductions in operating cost to be achieved. The reduction in operating 
cost for specific aircraft is shown to be significant as experience with its 
operation is gathered; also, improvement in specific configurations are very 
powerful in reducing operating costs by reducing airframe drag and by installation 
of more fuel efficient engines. Along with this improvement inoperating cost,
 
there is increased productivity due to increasing the passenger capacity by 
lengthening the fuselage (stretching). 
The engine maintenance scene has been treated in a similar fashion to show 
that gains are achieved by introduction of successive generations of engines and 
careful control of maintenance requirements and costs. Further improvements 
through reductions of structural weights, basic drag (by airfoil modifications 
and active controls), and engine fuel consumption, as well as noise reduction, 
all tend to provide the basic technology for the next generation of transports. 
As history has shown, the form of these future transports will be decided by the 
market forces as well as the technological state of the art at the time the 
decision is made to proceed with a new airplane. 
TABLE I TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS PHASES, FROM ENOSI
 
ALPHA PHASE
 
o 	 Invention,
 
o 	 Succeeding development in both laboratory and pilot operations, and
 
finally
 
o. 	 Installation or production in the first commercial plant. At the
 
end of the alpha phase it is in competition with the product of the
 
existing process.
 
BETA 	PHASEL
 
Improvement of the innovation, and can be of three types
 
6 	 Construction of larger units to take advantage of inherent economies
 
of scale.
 
o 	 The adoption of ancillary advances by other industries.
 
o 	 The increase in operating skill or know how.
 
2 .~L.Enos, P. 317,Inventions & Innovation in the Petroleum Refining
 
Industry in the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton
 
University Press, 1962.
 
ADVANCE 
AIRCRAFr 
BOEING 80-A 
FORD TRIMDTOR 
BOEING 80-B 
BOEING 247 
DC-3/L-10 
DC-4 
STRATOLINER 
CONSTELLATIONDC-6,240,202, 
STRATO CRUISER 
DC-7/1049 
VISOOUNT/LECTRA 
COMT4E1-
707/DC-8 TJ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
v 
V 
V 
V 
/ 
V 
/ 
/ / / 
_ / 
/ / / 
V //V 
/ / V 
V/ V// 
/V 
/ / 
V VV 
/V/ 
/ V V _ 
/ 
/ 
v/ 
V/ V 
V /V 
V// / 
VVVV 
V 
/ 
V / 
V 
V/ 
/ vV' 
V 
/V / 
V V 
/ V / 
/ V 
V 
/ 
/V 
/ 
-
V 
V 
_ 
V / 
/ 
// 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
_ 
_ _/ 
707/DC-8/720 TF _ _ / V _ / V / V / V / / [ 
727/DC-9/737 __ V ___ V V / V /I 
747/I)C-I0/I011- / / / - - / /i / / /V // 
TABLE II - TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN TRANSPORT AIRCRAF-T 
"w R 4UAJTY 
TABLE III SUGGESTED ALPHA-BETA PHASES - US AIR TRANISPORT SYSTF! AIRCRAFT 
PHASE CHA!GE 

BEGINNING 

NACA cowl introduced
 
Increased aerodynamic 

and structural efficiency; 

increased productivity, 

lower operating cost 

Increased size, speed 

.(productivity) lower 

operating cost increased 

passenger comfort 

Pressurized cabin, larger 

size-increased payload 

high-altitude 	operations,
 
a 	 increased ride comfort, in­
creased prbductivity, lower
 
orerating cost
 
Use of turbo prop. 

increased speed -productivity 
increased size 
DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT TYPES AND 

IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS
 
2-3 engine biplanes-fabric covered 

N 
3 engine high wing monoplane, solid
 
wing surface, either plywood or metal 

2-engine low wing monoplane, smooth
 
stressed skin-all metal structure with
 
controllable pitch propeller and re­
tractable ldg gear 

constant RPM propeller, deicing-mechanical, 

pressurized cabin, exhaust heat 

deicing, 4-engine low wing monoplane, tri-

cycle landing gear, flaps 

4
-engine low wing all metal monoplane 

with pressurized cabin
 
larger aircraft, longer range increased 

passenger capacity increased speed 
compound engine, more powerful flaps 

A/C DESIGNATION
 
Boeing 80A, 80B
 
Fokker Ford
 
247
 
DC-2, L-10 DC3, LI2, L14
 
M 202
 
404
 
220
 
44o 
Dc 4 
307
 
DC-6, 6B
 
049 Dc-T2 
049 B 377 
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.1049c L-188 
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High Bypass ratio turbo-fan 
increased size and productivity 
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lower operating cost 
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lower direct operating cost body ion 
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YEAR 
PRODUCTIVITY 
CHAGE, AS x V 0 
actual increase 
DOC COST CHANGE, 
CENTS/SK 
actual reduction 
CRUISE SPEED, MPH 
actval increase 
DC-3 Gen 
to 
307 Gen 
1940 9400 ­
3700 
5700 
(150%) 
4.78 
3.23 
- + 1.55 200 
180 
- +20 
30.7 Gen 
to 
Comet 
1952 9400 -
21500 
12,100 
(129%) 
3.2 ­
4.23 
-1.03 49o 
200 
- +290 
p 
307 Gen 
to 
(707,TJ) Gen 
1959 9400 -
73000 
66,600 
(726%) 
3.2 -
1.72 
+ 1.48 I 58o 200 - +380 
Comet only had speed and 
comfort of flight to sell, 
not increased productivity 
or reduced costs - See Fig. 5. 
T Fan 
narrow body(707) 
to 
T Fan 
wide body 
(747) 
1970 73000 
to 
218,000 
145,000 
(197%) 
1.015.-
715 
+.300 590 
58o 
- +10 
TABLE SIBETA PHASE EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY, DIRECT OPERATING 
COSTS A D CRUISI-NG SPEEDS FOR AMERICAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SIICE 1933 
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YEAR 
1note 
-
Productivity Change 
AS x V0 
ACTUAL INCREASE 
8 - 12,800 
216oo (710%) 
DOC Cost Change 
C nts/SM 
ACTUAL INCREASE 
7.87 -5.60 
Cruise Speed 
- MPH 
ACTUAL INCREASE 
170 to 280 +110 
HeparksReparks 
later version of 
2-engine machine were 
pressurized, also 
large juzp is from 
1940 to 1947 time 
period where technology 
accumulation durin4 
WW II iras utilized. 
h-engine series 
307- 1049C/DC7C 
1952 to 
1964 
9400 ­
25200 
15,800 
(169%) 
3.20 to 
1.88 
-1.32 200 to 
310 
+110 
4-engine turbo Jet 
series 
Begin W/Comet 1952 to 
1964 
21500 
to 
73000 
+51,500 
(240%) 
4.25 to 
1.13 
-3.12 
" 
490 to 
61o 
120 
Begin W/TO7 1959 to 
1964 
73,000 
60,500 
-12,500 
(-17.1%) 
1.70 
1.13 
-.57 580 to 
61o 
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Figure 13.- Engine maintenance -removal rates. 
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Figure 14.- Engine remval for overhaul and repairs vs time. 
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Figure 16.- Tim lapse from conception to first service. 
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Figure 17.- Reynolds number sensitive phenomena for various types of aircraft.
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Figure 18.- Effect of transonic research on the subsonic transport. 
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Figure 19.- The growing Reynolds number gap. 
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Figure 20.- Aircraft fuel efficiency trends. 
Development -- Date of Introduction ____ ____ 
Date Prm- 1946- 1951- 1955- 1958- 1961- 1964- 1967- Not 
1946 1948 1953 1957 1960 1962 1967 1969 Applied 
Pre-1945 29 19 10 8 24 8 10 , 24 
1945-1950 1 3 13 41 6 7 35 
1951-1955 1 28 17 16- 1 33 
1956-1960 1 6 29 6 58 
1961-1965 17 8 59 
1966-1969 1 2 29 
(a) Summary of aggregate advances. 
Figure 21.- Time profile for utilization of technical advances in aircraft.
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(b)Utilization of advances in aerodynamics. 
Figure 21 - Continued. 
Date of Introduction 
Development 
Data Pre- 1946. 1951- 1955- 1958. 1961- 1964- 1967- Not 
1945 1948 1953 1957 1960 1962 1967 1969 Applied 
Pre-1945 6 4 1 6 2 2 11 
1945-1950 2 12 3 1 12 
1951-1955 10 8 4 1 8 
1956-1960 1 1 4 1 17 
1961-1965 1 3 18 
1966-1969 10 
(c)Utilization of advances inpropulsion. 
Figure 21.- Continued. 
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(d) Utilization of advances in Structures. 
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-(e) Utilization of advances in avionics. 
Figure 21.- Continued. 
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(f) Utilization of advances in flight mechanics. 
Figure 21 - Continued. 
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(g)Utilization of advances in safety. 
Figure 21.- Continued. 
Development 
Date 
Pre-1945 
Pro-
1945 
1946. 
1948 
4 
1951-
1953 
1 
Date of Introduction 
1955. 1958- 1961-
1957 1960 1962 
1964-
1967 
1 
1967-
1969 
-
Not 
Applied 
2 
1945-1950 3 1 Co 
1951-1956 4 1 2 1 
1956-1960 3 5 
1961-1965 2 5 
1966-1969 
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Figure 21 - Continued. 
Development 
Dato 
Pre-1945 
Pro. 
1945 
1946. 
1948 
I 
19S1-
1953 
1 
Date of Introduction 
1956- 1958- 1961-
1957 1960 1962 
1 1 
1964-
1967 
1967. 
1969 
Not 
Applied 
1 
1945-1950 1 1 2 5 
1951-1955 1 
19S6-1960 1 3 
1961-1965 1 6 
1966-1969 2 
(i) Utilization of other advances. 
Figure 21.- Concluded. 
BOEING USE
MATERIAL 

NOMEX - nylon.flber 747 interior, e.g. ceiling & sidewall panels, stowage
 boxes, seat covers
(DuPont) 

747 interiors, e.g. passenger service unit, speaker
LEXAN 
 panels, window reveals
(General Electric) 

Fiber reinforced helicopter blades
PRD49 - fiber 

(DuPont)
 
TEDLAR - hard, impervious film 747/707 interiors, e.g. 707 vinyl coating, 747 
sidewall
 
panel coating
(DuPont) 

Source: Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company, Mj. cit. Figure 16 
Examples of materials used by Boeing but developed elsewhere.Figure 22.-
ITEM 	 BOEING USE OTHER APPLICATIONS
 
o 	Structural Failure Sensing/ Failure detection for Inexpensive and reliable detection for many ­
helicopter transmissions types of oil-lubricated mechanical equipment
Warning Device 

o Teflon Coating Process 	 To coat metal jigs to Coatinq for stainless steel cookware to
 
Boeclad 	 prevent adhesives from provide scratch-resistant, long wearing surface
 
sticking
 
o Roto-Scanner 	 Test'straight, countersunk, Same - in any structural member
 
and taper-shank fastener
 
holes to detect hidden
 
cracks
 
o 	Flip-Lok Bushing As permanently.retained Same - auto industry
 
bushings
 
o Aero-Caster 	 Technology from air Air bearing transporters for movement of
 
cushion vehicle work almost anything. Currently used in
 
aircraft industry, auto industry. Could
 
even move buildings.
 
o Molalloy solid lubricant 	 Bearings, seals4 gears, Same 'inother industries
 
clutch facings, electric
 
motor bushing, etc.
 
Beta Scope 	 Quality control measuring Same in other industries
o 

of thin films
 
Source: Boeing Commerical Aircraft Company, op. cit. Figure 17 
Figure 23.- Boeing invention disclosures developed'for non-aircraft
 
applications.
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APPENDIX A
 
Productivity
 
Productivity in the air transport industry is considered to be the amount of
 
work an airplane can do for the operator in a given time and hence it is a
 
measure of the -revenue generating potential of the aircraft and can-be expressed
 
as ton-miles per hour I or passenger miles per hour2. Productivity when examined
 
from the operator's viewpoint3-includes Considerations of -the aircraft utiliza­
tion (hours flown per year), passenger load factor and service life, in addition
 
to number of seats and the cruising speed, but in this paper we will use(AS x Vc)
 
as a direct measure of productivity.
 
Revenue generating potential can also be increased by reducing operating costs.
 
When the costs are reduced to such an extent that the return to the airline.
 
exceeds a fixed percentage (return on investment greater than average 12-15%)
 
then the fare for the user can be reduced. This fare reduction can lead to an
 
expansion in the.market and a requirement for more aircraft (of the same or
 
advanced type), providing the machines on hand are utilized to their fullest
 
extent (i.e., operated at highest desirable load factor). In addition,to con­
sideration of AS x Vc as an index of productivity, we will examine and discuss
 
the changes in Direct Operating Costs per aircraft seat mile (DOC). In all
 
considerations of productivity, and DOC, it must be remembered that the operation
 
must show a profit or be subsidized to continue operations.
 
lStratford, Alan H., 
Air Transport Economics in the Supersonic Era, 
MacMillan & Co./St. Martins Press, N.Y., 1967, fig. 2.1, p. 40. 
2Black, Richard H., and Stern, John A., Advanced SubsonicTransports 
- A Challenge 
for the 1990's. Douglas Aircraft paper 6336, AIAA Paper #75-304 (see fig. 5
 
and discussion).
 
3 Glasgow, Charles S., Improving Aircraft Productivity - We all Have Part of the
 
Action, Douglas Paper 6219, presented to the Air Transport Association of
 
America. Engineering and Maintenance. Conference, Key Biscayne, Miami,
 
Florida, Oct. 10-1-2, 1973.
 
•'
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APPENDIX B
 
TOTFAL PRODUCTIVITY IN4PROVENBN1OF AIR TPN$PORT INDUSTRY 
The attached Figures, A-I and A-II show quantitatively what the overall 
increased labor productivity has been in civil air transport and a calculation 
of what the significance of this has been in terms of.social saving. 
Additional information which underscores the productivity growth of the
 
airlines over the period is demonstrated by the decrease in the cost to the
 
users per passenger mile, from $.34 in 1940 to about S.06 fn 1974, all in
 
1975 dollars. This is an average of about 5% per annum reduction in the revenue
 
collected from the user per passenger. Corresponding to this reduced user cost
 
is the increased demand for airline serviees, rising from around 10 billion
 
revenue passenger miles in 1950 to about 350 billion in 1974, representing a 16% 
per annum increase, as shown in Figures A-III and A-IV. 
1Boeing Conercial Airplane Company, op- it., p. 4 and Figures 8 and 9. 
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ORIGINAl] WfAO 13OF POOR QUIJMTY 
Output/year Output2 ao Unit 
Force laborLabor 
1929 0.5 2.3 22.6 
1930 1.3 3.5 37.1 
1931 1.5 5.5 27.3 
1932 1.3 6.8 26.5 
1933 2.4 7.2 33.3 
1934 2.8 7.7 36.4 
1935 4.6 8.9 51.7 
1936 6.3 11.0 57.3 
1937 7.1 13.0 54.6 
1938 8.0 15.0 53.3 
1939 10.6 17.6 60.2 
1940 15.2 229 66.4 
1941 20.4 29.3 69.6 
1942 24.7 41.0 60.2 
1943 31.7 55.4 57.2 
1944 42.6 56.6 75.3 
1945 60.9 63.9 95.3 
1946 87.1 98.8 88.2 
1947 100.0 100.0 -100.0 
1948 104.5 96.4 108.4 
1949 117.3 95.2 123.2 
1950 136.0 95.2 142-9 
1951 171.2 108.4 157.9 
.1952 199.4 124.1 160.7 
1953 228.5 132.5 172.5 
I- The Indices have been normalised to bae year of 1947 
2-" Output is proportional to "revenue pas.senger milesr 
source: "Kendrick, sa. Sit. 555 
Figure A-I.- Historical indices of airline transport labor productivity. 
(All prices 1954)
 
1964 traffic levels 106.316 x 109. available seat miles flown
 
Operating costs/seat mile
 
1933 $ 	.078 
1964 $ 016
 
Cost of 1933 technology in 1964 = $ 8.293 x 109
 
Cost of 1964 " " " = $ 1.701 x 109
 
Airline Expenses, 1964 =$3.275 x 109
 
Social Savings = (8.293 x 109 - 1.701 x 109) = $6.592 x 109
 
%.Social 	Saving = 6.592ff = 8o.3% 
Social Saving as % of Airline expenses: 3275
 
1964 expenses using 1933 a/c tech = ($3.275 +$6.592) x 109 49.867 x 109
 
% reduction due to tech advance = 6.59279.867 = 66.9%
 
Source: 	Handbook of Airline Statistics, CAB, Washington, D. C. 1973 editior.
 
Table i4, p. 22, col. 2, Total Certificated route, air carridrs
 
Figure A-II.- Calculation of social saving. 01 , 
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Figure A-Ill.- Revenue per passenger mile.
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Figure A-IV.- Growth of revenue passenger miles. 
